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 ABSTRACT 
 
 The Internet is a technological advance that provides access to information, and 
the ability to publish information, in revolutionary ways. There is also a major danger 
that provides the ability to corrupt and destroy information as well. When a computer is 
connected to the Internet, three things are put at risk: the data storage, the computing 
resources and the user’s reputation. In order to balance the advantages and risks, the 
contact between a computer and the Internet or the contact between different networks 
should be controlled carefully. 
 A firewall is a form of protection that allows a network to connect to the Internet 
or to another network while maintaining a degree of security. The firewall is an 
effective type of network security, and in most situations, it is the most effective tool for 
doing that. 
 With the availability of larger bandwidth, it is becoming more and more difficult 
for traditional software firewalls to function over a high-speed connection. In addition, 
the advances in network hardware technology, such as routers, and new applications of 
firewalls have caused the software firewall to be an impediment to high throughput. 
This network bottleneck leads to the requirement for new solutions to balance 
performance and security. Replacing software with hardware could lead to improved 
performance, enabling the firewalls to handle significantly larger amounts of data.  
 The goal of this project is to investigate if and how existing desktop computer 
firewall technology could be improved by replacing software functionality with 
hardware (i.e., silicon). A hardware-based Silicon Firewall system has been designed by 
choosing the appropriate architecture and implemented using Altera FPGA (Field 
Programmable Gate Array) on a SOPC (System On a Programmable Chip) Board. The 
performance of the Silicon Firewall is tested and compared with the software firewall. 
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 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the Internet security problem is introduced and different kinds of risk 
types and attack types are discussed. A number of security models are presented. The 
firewall is introduced as the most effective method. Finally, Silicon Firewall feasibility 
and the objective of this research project are introduced.  
1.1 Internet Security 
The Internet is a technological advance that provides access to information, and the 
ability to publish information, in revolutionary ways [1]. The benefits include, but are 
not limited to, information gathering, customer service, and improved publicity. With 
the rapid development of the information superhighway, millions of people are 
exchanging information through the Internet. 
But it’s also a major danger that provides the ability to pollute and destroy information. 
This means the Internet is a two-edge sword and, because it influences millions of 
people, the risks are obviously high on the Internet. 
1.1.1 Risk Types 
When computers are connected to the Internet, three things are put at risk:
• The data stored on the computers 
• The computer system resources 
• The user’s reputation
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 a. Data Storage 
1) Privacy: keeping it confidential.  
2) Integrity: preventing it from being changed by other people. 
3) Availability: accessing it freely. 
b. Computing Resources 
Computing resources will not be wasted or destroyed if they are not used, because 
they are neither natural resources, nor are they limited resources. Since people spend 
money and time on their computing resources, they should have the right to 
determine their computers are used. 
c. User’s Reputation 
Sometimes an intruder appears on the Internet with another person’s identity, and 
anything that is done appears to come from the stolen identity. Generally, people 
who choose to do this aim for maximum impact, rather than believability. However 
even if only a few people believe it, it will take a long time to clean up your 
reputation, and it can be humiliating. Even if an intruder doesn’t use another 
person’s identity, unauthorized access to computers is not good for any 
organization, because it shakes people’s confidence in that organization. In addition, 
most intruders will attempt to go from an organization they broke in to others. This 
is going to make their next victim think that the breached organization is a platform 
for computer criminals. 
1.1.2 Attack Types  
There are many types of attacks [1], and many ways of categorizing them. In this 
section, the attacks are broken down into three basic categories: 
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 • Intrusion 
• Denial of service 
• Information theft 
a. Intrusion 
Intrusions are the most common attacks on systems. Intruders are actually able to 
control your computers as if they were legitimate users. 
b. Denial of Service 
A denial of service attack is such an attack that aimed entirely at preventing you 
from using your computer. 
c. Information Theft 
Usually these attacks exploit Internet services that are intended to give out 
information, including modifications to give out more information than was 
intended, or to give information to unauthorized users. The attacker can obtain 
information without ever having to directly use your computers. 
1.2 Security Models 
There are a variety of security models to protect against the kinds of attacks outlined in 
the previous section, ranging from no security through obscurity, host security, to 
network security. 
No security model can solve all the problems. Why bother then? Security may not 
prevent every single incident, but it can keep an incident from seriously damaging or 
even shutting down the whole system. 
1.2.1 Security through Obscurity 
With this model, a system is presumed to be secure provided nobody knows about it.
 3 
 This approach seldom works for long time because there are too many ways to find an 
attractive target. 
Many people presume that even though attackers can find them, they won’t bother to. 
They think that a small company or a home machine just isn’t going to be of interest to 
intruders. But the fact is that many intruders aren’t aiming at particular targets; their 
purpose is just breaking into as many machines as possible. They look at small 
companies and home machines as easy targets. Even if they won’t stay long, they will 
attempt to break in and they may do substantial damage if they do get in as they try to 
cover their tracks.  
A site has to do at least a minimal amount of registration in order to function on any 
network including the Internet. Intruders watch out for new connections, hoping that 
these sites won’t yet have security measures in place.  
The number of ways that someone can determine security-sensitive information is 
amazing. For example, knowing the hardware and software and the version of the 
operating system gives the intruders important clues about what security holes they 
might try. They can often get this information from the host registration, or by trying to 
connect to the computer. Sometime, an intruder even doesn’t need to access the 
computer to get it, since many computers disclose their type of operating system in the 
greeting you get before you log in.  
1.2.2 Host Security 
Host security probably is the most common model for computer security [1]. With this 
model, the security of each host machine is enforced separately, and the effort is made 
to avoid or alleviate all the known security problems that might affect that particular 
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 host. However, the host security doesn’t scale to large numbers of machines, even 
though it does works on individual machines. 
The complexity and diversity are the major impediment to effective host security in 
modern computing environments. Machines from multiple vendors are included in most 
modern environments, each with its own operating system and its own set of security 
problems. Even if the site has machines from only one vendor, the security problems for 
different releases of the same operating system could be significantly different. Also, 
there could be a problem even if all these machines are from a single vendor and run a 
single release of the operating system, since different configurations (different services 
enabled, and so on) can bring different subsystems into play (and into conflict) and lead 
to different sets of security problems. 
Further more, even if the machines are completely identical, the sheer number of them 
at some sites can make securing all of them difficult. Thus, effectively implementing 
and maintaining host security takes a significant amount of upfront and ongoing work.  
Even if all that work has been done correctly, host security still often fails due to bugs 
in vendor software, or due to a lack of suitable software for some required functions. 
Also, host security relies on both the good intentions and the skill of everyone who has 
privileged access to any machine. With the increasing number of machines, the number 
of privileged users generally increases as well. Compared to attaching a machine to a 
network, securing a machine is much more difficult, therefore insecure machines may 
appear on your network as unexpected surprises.  
A host security model may be more appropriate for small sites, or sites with extreme 
security requirements. Indeed, some level of host security should be included in all the 
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 site’s overall security plans. Even if a network security model is adopted, certain 
systems will benefit from the strongest host security. The problem is that making the 
host security model work requires too many restrictions and too many people, so this 
model alone isn’t cost-effective for any but small or simple sites. 
1.2.3 Network Security 
A network security model tries to control network access to local hosts and their 
services, rather than secure them individually. Network security models involve 
building firewalls to protect internal systems and networks and using strong 
authentication approaches and encryption to protect particularly sensitive data as it 
transits over the network. This model is an efficient and effective method to secure a 
larger and more diverse computer environment. 
1.3 Firewalls  
A firewall is a component or a set of components that restrict access between a 
protected network and the Internet, or between sets of networks [1]. It is a very effective 
type of network security. There are two kinds of firewalls: Internet firewalls and 
internal firewalls.  
1.3.1 Internet Firewalls 
A firewall is designed to keep a fire from spreading from one part of the building to 
another during building construction. A similar purpose is served by an Internet 
firewall. In theory: It prevents the dangers of the Internet from spreading to the internal 
network. In practice, an Internet firewall serves multiple purposes: 
• Restrict people to entering at a carefully controlled point. 
• Restrict people to leaving at a carefully controlled point. 
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 • Prevent attackers from getting close to your other defenses. 
An Internet firewall is often installed at the point where the protected internal network 
connects to the Internet, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
Internet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Desktop Desktop Desktop
Firewall 
Internal network 
Desktop
Figure 1.1 Internet Firewall 
All traffic coming from the Internet or going out from the internal network passes 
through the firewall. Consequently, the firewall has the opportunity to ensure that the 
traffic -- email, file transfer, remote logins, or any kinds of interaction between specific 
systems -- conform to the security policy. These security policies are set by each site; 
some are highly restrictive and others fairly open. 
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 1.3.2 Internal Firewalls 
In some situations, parts of the internal network need to be protected from other parts. 
There are a number of reasons to do this: 
• There are test or lab networks with unpredictable things going on there. 
• There are networks that are less secure than the rest of the site.  
• There are networks that are more secure than the rest of the site. 
Firewalls are a useful technology in another situation. In some cases, a firewall sits 
between two parts of the same organization, or between two separate organizations that 
share a network, rather than between a single organization and the Internet. This kind of 
firewall is called an internal firewall. Figure 1.2 shows an internal firewall architecture 
within a laboratory network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Desktop 
Laboratory Network 
Firewall 
Desktop Desktop
DesktopDesktop
Internal Network 
Figure 1.2 Internal Firewall
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 Logically, a firewall is a restrictor, a separator, and an analyzer [1]. There are various 
ways to configure this equipment; the configuration will depend upon a site’s particular 
security policy, budget, and overall operation. 
1.4 Firewall Capability 
Firewalls can do a lot for site’s security, but they also have some drawbacks.  
1. What can a firewall do? 
a. A firewall is a focus for security decisions 
A firewall is a checkpoint through which all traffic in and out must pass. It lets 
you concentrate network security on this checkpoint where your network 
connects to the Internet. Focusing your security in this way is much more 
efficient than spreading security decisions and technologies around individual 
machines. 
b. A firewall can enforce security policy 
Many of the services that people need from the Internet are inherently not 
secure. The firewall enforces the site’s security policy, allowing only services 
defined by the security rules to pass through. 
c. A firewall can log Internet activity efficiently 
Because all traffic passes through the firewall, the single point of access, the 
firewall can record the interactions between the protected network and the 
external network. 
d. A firewall limits your exposure 
 A firewall will sometimes be used to keep one section of your site’s network
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 from another section to prevent the problems that impact one section from 
spreading through the entire network (internal firewall). 
2. What can’t a firewall do? 
Although firewalls provide protection against most network threats, they are not a 
complete security solution. Certain threats are beyond the control of the firewall: 
a. A firewall can’t protect you against malicious insiders 
 An inside user can attack your systems without passing through the firewall. 
b. A firewall can’t protect against connections that don’t go through it 
 A firewall can’t control the traffic that doesn’t pass through it. 
c. A firewall can’t protect against new threats 
A firewall is designed to protect against known threats. However, no firewall 
can automatically defend every new threat that arises. You can’t set up a firewall 
once and expect it to protect you forever. 
d. A firewall can’t protect against viruses 
Firewalls can’t keep viruses out of a protected network. Firewalls scan all 
incoming traffic to determine whether it is allowed to pass through to the 
internal network. Nevertheless, the scanning is based on the source and 
destination addresses and port numbers, not on the content of data. 
As a consequence, you need to augment the firewall by incorporating function 
separation, physical security, host security, and user education into your overall 
security plan. 
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 Given the limitations above, why bother to install a firewall? Because a firewall is 
the most effective way to connect a network to the Internet while maintaining a 
degree of security. And in most situations, it’s the most effective tool for doing that. 
1.5 Silicon Firewall Feasibility  
With the availability of bandwidth, it is becoming more and more difficult for a 
traditional software firewall to function with a high-speed connection. In addition, the 
advances in network hardware technology, such as routers and new applications of 
firewalls have caused the software firewall to be an impediment to high throughput. 
This network bottleneck leads to the requirement of new solutions to balance the 
performance and security. Replacing software with a hardware (silicon) firewall could 
lead to improved performance, enabling the firewall to handle significantly larger 
amount of data.  
1.6 Research Objectives 
The goal of this project is to investigate if and how existing desktop computer firewall 
technology could be improved by replacing software functionality with hardware 
(silicon). A microprocessor-based system has been designed by choosing the 
appropriate architecture and implemented using Altera FPGA (Field Programmable 
Gate Array) on a SOPC (System on a Programmable Chip) Board. Furthermore, the 
performance of the Silicon Firewall is tested and compared with the software firewall. 
1.7 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters: In Chapter 2, packet filtering is presented. 
In Chapter 3, hardware software system codesign is described. In Chapter 4, the Altera 
Nios embedded processor is introduced. NDK (Nios Development Kit) and NEDK 
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 (Nios Ethernet Development Kit) are also presented. In Chapter 5, The Silicon Firewall 
design is introduced in detail. Two major peripherals, the CAM (Content Addressable 
Memory) and the CS8900A are introduced as well as the two operating modes of the 
Silicon Firewall, hardware mode and software mode. In Chapter 6, testing and results 
are explained. In Chapter 7, a summary of this research is presented and future work is 
suggested.  
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 Chapter 2 INTERNET FIREWALL SECURITY SYSTEMS 
Basic Internet firewall security strategies are presented in this chapter. Packet filtering 
is introduced as the method selected by this research project to build the Silicon 
Firewall. For a good understanding of packet filtering, TCP/IP fundamentals are also 
presented. 
2.1 Security Strategies 
In this section some basic strategies employed in building firewalls and in enforcing 
security will be introduced. 
2.1.1 Least Privilege 
Least privilege is perhaps the most fundamental principle of any kind of security, not 
just computer and network security. Basically, the principle of least privilege means that 
any object (user, administrator, program, system, etc.) should have only the privilege 
the object needs to perform its assigned tasks—and no more [1]. Least privilege is an 
important principle for limiting the exposure to attacks and for limiting the damage 
caused by particular attacks. 
For example, probably not every user needs to access every Internet service, probably 
not every user needs to modify (or even read) every file on the system, probably not 
every user needs to know the machine’s root password, probably not every system 
administrator needs to know the root password for all the system, probably not every 
system needs to access every other system’s files. 
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 In order to apply the principle of least privilege, ways should be explored to reduce the 
privilege required for various operations. 
2.1.2 Defense in Depth 
Defense in depth is another principle of any security system. It means not depending on 
just one security mechanism, instead, install multiple mechanisms that back each other 
up. The advantage of defense in depth is that the failure of any single security 
mechanism will not totally compromise the system. 
Any security system—even the most seemingly impenetrable firewall—can be breached 
by attackers who are willing to take enough risk [1]. Multiple mechanisms can be 
adopted to provide backup and redundancy for each other: network security, host 
security and human security. All of these mechanisms are important and can be highly 
effective.  
2.1.3 Choke Point 
A choke point forces attackers to use a narrow channel that can be monitored and 
controlled. In network security, the firewall between the Internet and the internal 
network is such a choke point (assuming that it’s the only connection between the 
Internet and the internal network). Any attacker who’s going to attack the internal 
network from the Internet is going to have to come through that channel. 
A choke point is useless if there’s an effective way for an attacker to go around it [1]. In 
this way, chances are that an adequate job of defending any of the avenues of attack 
can’t be done, or someone will slip through one while another is being defended.  
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 2.1.4 Weakest Link 
A fundamental property of security is that a chain is only as strong as its weakest 
linkand a wall is only as strong as its weakest point. The weak points are always hunted 
by smart attackers, so attention should be paid evenly to all aspects of the security 
system. 
2.1.5 Fail-Safe Stance  
According to [1] 
 
“Another fundamental principle of security is that, to the extent possible, 
systems should fail safe, that is, if they’re going to fail, they should fail 
in such a way that they deny access to an attacker, rather than letting the 
attacker in. The failure may also result in denying access to legitimate 
users as well, until repairs are made, but this is usually an acceptable 
tradeoff.” 
 
2.1.6 Universal Participation 
Most security systems require the universal participation (or at least the absence of 
active opposition) of a site’s personnel in order to be fully effective. For example, 
everybody should report strange happenings that might be security-related, everybody 
should choose good passwords, change them regularly; and not to give them out to their 
friends, relatives, etc.. 
2.1.7 Diversity of Defense 
The idea behind diversity of defense is that using security systems from different 
vendors may reduce the chances of a common bug or configuration error that 
compromises them all [1].  Just as using a number of different systems to provide depth 
of defense gives additional security, using a number of different types of systems also 
gives additional security. However, there is a tradeoff between complexity and cost, so 
evaluation and decision need to be made by each site concerning this issue. 
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 2.1.8 Simplicity 
There are two reasons for making simplicity a security strategy. First, it is easier to 
understand simpler things; second, nooks and crannies are provided by complexity for 
all sorts of things to hide in.  
2.2 TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) /IP (Internet Protocol) Fundamentals 
Today the two major approaches used to build firewalls are packet filtering and proxy 
services. The packet filtering method is selected for this research project. Since a good 
understanding of TCP /IP is needed to follow the details of the discussions of packet 
filtering, TCP/IP fundamentals will be presented. 
2.2.1 Introduction to TCP/IP 
TCP and IP are two of the most important protocols in the suite of data communications 
protocols, even though there are many other protocols. The TCP/IP protocol has the 
following features (according to [1]): 
• “Open protocol standards, freely available and developed independently from 
any specific computer hardware or operating system. Because it is so widely 
supported, TCP/IP is ideal for uniting different hardware and software. 
• Independence from specific physical network hardware. This allows TCP/IP to 
integrate many different kinds of networks. TCP/IP can be run over an Ethernet, 
a token ring, a dial-up line, an X.25 net, and virtually any other kind of physical 
transmission media. 
• A common addressing scheme that allows any TCP/IP device to uniquely 
addresses any other device in the entire network, even if the network is as large 
as the worldwide Internet. 
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 • Standardized high-level protocols for consistent, widely available user services.” 
2.2.2 OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) Reference Model 
The International Standards Organization (ISO), began to develop its Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) networking suite in the 1980s [2]. There are two major 
components in OSI: an abstract model of networking (the Basic Reference Model, or 
seven-layer model) and a set of concrete protocols.  
There are seven layers in the OSI Reference Model as shown in table 2.1. One or more 
entities implement its functionality at each layer. Each entity interacts directly only with 
the layer below it, and provides facilities for use by the layer on top of it. Protocols 
enable an entity in one host to interact with a corresponding entity, which is at the same 
layer in a remote host. 
Table 2.1 Seven Layers of The OSI Basic Reference Model (after [2]) 
1. Physical Layer 
2. Data link Layer 
3. Network Layer 
4. Transport Layer 
5. Session Layer 
6. Presentation Layer 
7. Application Layer 
 
The seven layers of the OSI Basic Reference Model [2] are (from bottom to top): 
1. The Physical Layer describes the physical properties of the various 
communications media, as well as the electrical properties and interpretation of 
the exchanged signals. For example, this layer defines the size of Ethernet 
coaxial cable, the type of BNC connector used, and the termination method.  
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 2. The Data Link Layer describes the logical organization of data bits transmitted 
on a particular medium. For example, this layer defines the framing, addressing 
and checksumming of Ethernet packets.  
3. The Network Layer describes how a series of exchanges over various data links 
can deliver data between any two nodes in a network. For example, this layer 
defines the addressing and routing structure of the Internet.  
4. The Transport Layer describes the quality and nature of the data delivery. For 
example, this layer defines if and how retransmissions will be used to ensure 
data delivery.  
5. The Session Layer describes the organization of data sequences larger than the 
packets handled by lower layers. For example, this layer describes how request 
and reply packets are paired in a remote procedure call.  
6. The Presentation Layer describes the syntax of data being transferred. For 
example, this layer describes how floating point numbers can be exchanged 
between hosts with different math formats.  
7. The Application Layer describes how real work actually gets done. For 
example, this layer would implement file system operations. 
2.2.3 TCP/IP Protocol Architecture 
There is no universal agreement about how to describe TCP/IP with a layered model. 
Generally, it is viewed as being composed of fewer than the seven layers used in the 
OSI model. Three to five functional levels in the protocol architecture are defined in 
most descriptions of TCP/IP. The four-level model illustrated in table 2.2 is based on 
the three layers (Application, Host-to-Host, and Network Access) shown in the 
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 Department of Defense (DOD) Protocol Model in the Defense Data Network (DDN) 
Protocol Handbook - Volume 1, with the addition of a separate Internet layer [1]. This 
model provides a reasonable graphic representation of the layers in the TCP/IP protocol 
hierarchy. 
Table 2.2 Four Layers In The TCP/IP Protocol Architecture (after [3]) 
4. Application Layer Consists of applications and processes that use the 
network 
3. Host-to-Host Transport 
Layer 
Provides end-to-end data delivery services 
2. Internet Layer 
 
Defines the datagram and handles the routing of data 
1. Network Access Layer 
 
Consists of routines for accessing physical networks 
 
1. Network Access Layer 
The lowest layer of the TCP/IP protocol hierarchy is the Network Access Layer. In 
this layer, the protocols provide the ways for the system to transmit data to the other 
devices on a directly attached network. It defines how to use the network to deliver 
an IP datagram. Unlike higher-level protocols, the details of the underlying network 
(its packet structure, addressing, etc.) must be known by the Network Access Layer 
protocols to correctly format the data being transmitted to comply with the network 
constraints. The TCP/IP Network Access Layer can include the functions of all 
three lower layers of the OSI reference Model (Network, Data Link, and Physical). 
Functions performed at this level include encapsulation of IP datagrams into the 
frames transmitted by the network, and mapping of IP addresses to the physical 
addresses used by the network [4]. The universal addressing scheme is one of 
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 TCP/IP's strengths. The IP address must be converted into an address that is suitable 
for the physical network over which the datagram is transmitted. 
2. Internet Layer 
The Internet Layer is the layer above the Network Access Layer in the protocol 
hierarchy. The Internet Protocol is the most significant protocol in the Internet 
Layer and is the heart of TCP/IP. IP provides the fundamental packet delivery 
service on which TCP/IP networks are built. All protocols, in the layers above and 
below IP, use the Internet Protocol to transmit data. All TCP/IP data flows through 
IP, incoming and outgoing, regardless of its ultimate destination. 
The Internet Protocol is the building block of the Internet [5]. Its functions include: 
• Defining the datagram, which is the basic unit of transmission in the Internet 
• Defining the Internet addressing scheme 
• Moving data between the Network Access Layer and the Host-to-Host 
Transport Layer 
• Routing datagrams to remote hosts 
• Performing fragmentation and re-assembly of datagrams 
The TCP/IP protocols were built to deliver data over the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), which was a packet switching network)[5]. 
A packet is a block of data, which carries with it the information needed to deliver 
it - in a manner similar to a postal letter, which has an address written on its 
envelope. The addressing information in the packets is used by a packet switching 
network to switch packets from one physical network to another, moving them 
toward their final destination. Each packet travels the network separately. 
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 The datagram is the packet format that defined by Internet Protocol [5]. Figure 2.1 
is a graphic representation of an IP datagram. The control information in the first 
five or six 32-bit words are called the header [5]. By default, the header is five 
words long; the sixth word is optional. There is a field called Internet Header Length 
(IHL) in the header that indicates the header's length in words, since the header's 
length is variable. All the information needed to deliver the packet is contained in 
the header. 
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Version IHL Type of Service 
Identification 
Protocol Time to Live 
Flags       Fragmentation Offset 
Header Checksum 
Total Length
0 
Bits
4 8 16 20 2412 28   31 
Data begins here... 
Options 
Padding 
Destination Address
Source Address
Figure 2.1 IP Datagram format (after [5])
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 The Internet Protocol transmits the datagram by checking the Destination Address 
in word 5 of the header. The Destination Address is a standard 32-bit IP address that 
identifies the destination network and the particular host on that network. The 
packet is transmitted directly to the destination if the Destination Address is the 
address of a host on the local network. Otherwise, the packet is passed to a gateway 
for delivery. Gateways are devices that switch packets between the different 
physical networks [5]. Routing is deciding which gateway to use [5]. The routing 
decision is made by IP for each individual packet. Figure 2.2 shows routing through 
gateways.  
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Figure 2.2 Routing Through Gateways (after [1]) 
The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is an integral part of IP. This 
protocol is part of the Internet Layer and uses the IP datagram transmission facility 
to send its messages. ICMP delivers messages that perform the following control, 
error reporting, and informational functions for TCP/IP (according to [5]): 
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 • Flow control  
When datagrams arrive too fast for processing, the destination host or an 
intermediate gateway sends an ICMP Source Quench Message back to the 
sender. This tells the source to stop sending datagrams temporarily. 
• Detecting unreachable destinations  
 
When a destination is unreachable, the system detecting the problem sends a 
Destination Unreachable Message to the datagram's source. If the 
unreachable destination is a network or host, the message is sent by an 
intermediate gateway. But if the destination is an unreachable port, the 
destination host sends the message.  
• Redirecting routes  
 
A gateway sends the ICMP Redirect Message to tell a host to use another 
gateway, presumably because the other gateway is a better choice. This 
message can be used only when the source host is on the same network as 
both gateways.  
• Checking remote hosts  
A host can send the ICMP Echo Message to see if a remote system's Internet 
Protocol is up and operational. When a system receives an echo message, it 
replies and sends the data from the packet back to the source host. The ping 
command uses this message [6]. 
3. Transport Layer 
The Host-to-Host Transport Layer is the protocol layer above the Internet Layer. 
This name is usually shortened to Transport Layer. The two most significant 
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 protocols in the Transport Layer are the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). UDP provides low-overhead, connectionless 
datagram transmission service. Reliable data delivery service is provided by TCP 
with end-to-end error detection and correction [7]. Both protocols transmit data 
between the Application Layer and the Internet Layer. Applications programmers 
can choose whichever service is more suitable for a specific application. 
• User Datagram Protocol 
Like the transmission service that IP provides the User Datagram Protocol 
gives application programs direct access to a datagram delivery service. This 
allows applications to exchange messages over the network with a minimum 
of protocol overhead. 
UDP is an untrustworthy, connectionless datagram protocol. 
“Untrustworthy” merely means that there are no facilities in the protocol for 
verifying that the data reached the other end of the network correctly. Within 
your computer, UDP will transmit data correctly. The 16-bit Source Port and 
Destination Port numbers in word 1 of the message header is used by UDP 
to deliver data to the correct application process. Figure 2.3 shows the UDP 
message format. 
  
                        
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 UDP Message Format (after [7]) 
31 0 
Data begins here …
16 
Bits
Destination Port 
ChecksumLength
Source Port
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 There are a number of good reasons why UDP is chosen as a data transport 
service. If the amount of data being delivered is small, the overhead of 
creating connections and ensuring reliable delivery may be greater than the 
work of re-transmitting the entire data set. In this case, the most efficient 
choice for a Transport Layer protocol is UDP.  
• Transmission Control Protocol 
TCP is used by applications that require the transport protocol to provide 
reliable data delivery because it verifies that data is delivered across the 
network accurately and in the proper sequence. TCP is such a protocol that is 
reliable, connection-oriented, and byte-stream. 
a. Reliable 
Reliability is provided by TCP with a mechanism called Positive 
Acknowledgment with Re-transmission (PAR). Simply stated, a 
system using PAR sends the data again until it hears from the remote 
system that the data arrived okay. A segment is the unit of data 
exchanged between cooperating TCP modules (see figure 2.4). A 
checksum that the recipient uses to verify that the data is undamaged 
is contained in each segment. The receiver sends a positive 
acknowledgment back to the sender if the data segment is received 
undamaged. Otherwise the receiver discards it. After an appropriate 
time-out period, the sending TCP module re-delivers any segment for 
which no positive acknowledgment has been received. 
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Options 
Window 
Destination Port
Offset Reserved Flags 
Checksum Urgent Pointer 
Acknowledgment Number 
Padding 
Sequence Number 
Bits 
0 4 8 16 20 2412 28 
Source Port
Data begins here... 
Figure 2.4 TCP Segment Format (after [7])
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 b. Connection-oriented  
TCP is connection-oriented. A logical end-to-end connection 
between the two communicating hosts is established by TCP. Control 
information, called a handshake, is exchanged between the two 
endpoints to establish a dialogue before data is delivered. The control 
function of a segment is indicated by setting the appropriate bit in the 
Flags field in word 4 of the segment header. 
c. Byte-stream 
The data sent by TCP is viewed as a continuous stream of bytes, not 
as independent packets. Thus, the sequence in which bytes are sent 
and received is maintained by TCP. Two fields in the TCP segment 
header, the Sequence Number and Acknowledgment Number, keep 
track of the bytes. 
4. Application Layer 
The Application Layer is at the top of the TCP/IP protocol architecture. All processes 
that use the Transport Layer protocols to deliver data are included in this layer. 
Following are the most widely known and implemented applications protocols [8]: 
Telnet: The Network Terminal Protocol that provides remote login over the 
network. 
FTP: The File Transfer Protocol that is used for interactive file transfer. 
 SMTP: The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol that delivers electronic mail. 
HTTP: The Hypertext Transfer Protocol that delivers Web pages over the 
network. 
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 2.3 Packet Filtering 
To understand packet filtering, packets and how they are handled at each layer of the 
TCP/IP protocol stack must be understood. 
2.3.1 Packet Definition 
To transfer information across a network, the information has to be broken up into small 
pieces, each of which is sent separately. Breaking the information into pieces allows 
many systems to share the network, each sending pieces in turn. In IP networking, those 
small pieces of data are called packets. All data transfer across IP network happens in 
the form of packets. So the packet is the fundamental unit of communication on the 
Internet. 
2.3.2 Packet Structure 
Packets are constructed in such a way that layers for each protocol used for a 
particularly connection are wrapped around the packets. At each layer, a packet has two 
parts: the header and the body. The header contains protocol information relevant to that 
layer, while the body contains the data for that layer which often consists of a whole 
packet from the next layer in the stack. Each layer treats the information it gets from the 
layer above it as data, and applies its own header to this data. At each layer, the packet 
contains all of the information passed from the higher layer; nothing is lost. The process 
of preserving the data while attaching a new header is known as encapsulation. Figure 
2.5 shows how this works. 
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(See figure 5.1) 
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Figure 2.5 Data Encapsulation (after [3]) 
At the application layer, the packet consists simply of the data to be transferred. As it 
moves to the transport layer, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP) preserves the data from the previous layer and attaches a 
header to it. At the next layer, IP considers the entire packet (composed now of the TCP 
or UDP header and the data) to be data, and now attaches its own IP header. Finally, at 
the network access layer, Ethernet or another network protocol considers the entire IP 
packet passed to it to be the data, and attaches its own header.  
2.3.3 Packet Filtering Definition 
Packet filtering is a network security mechanism that works by controlling what data 
can flow to and from a network. Packet filters allow or block packets, usually while 
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 routing them from one network to another (most often from the Internet to an internal 
network, and vice versa). To accomplish packet filtering, a set of rules that specify what 
types of packets are to be allowed and what types are to be blocked is set up. 
2.3.4 Reasons for Packet Filtering 
Packet filtering controls (allows or disallows) data transfer based on: 
• The address the data is (supposedly) coming from 
• The address the data is going to  
• The session and application protocols being used to transfer the data 
2.3.5 Advantages of Packet Filtering 
Packet filtering has a number of advantages: 
• One router can help protect an entire network 
One of the key advantages of packet filtering is that a single, strategically placed 
packet-filtering router can help protect an entire network. If there is only one 
router that connects the internal network to the Internet, tremendous leverage on 
network security will be gained, regardless of the size of the internal network, 
by doing packet filtering on that router. 
• Packet filtering doesn’t require user knowledge or cooperation 
Packet filtering doesn’t require any custom software or configuration of client 
machines, nor does it require any special training or procedure for users. 
• Packet filtering is widely available in many routers 
Packet filtering capabilities are available in many hardware and software routing 
products. 
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 2.3.6 Types of Packet Filtering 
Every packet has a set of headers containing certain information as mentioned in the 
previous section. The main information is: 
• IP source address 
• IP destination address 
• Protocol (whether the packet is a TCP, UDP, or ICMP packet) 
• TCP or UDP source port 
• TCP or UDP destination port 
• ICMP message type 
The information above can be used to set up the specific policy, for example, filtering 
by service, filtering by source port and so on. In this project, the IP source address is 
used as the policy, that is to say filtering the packet by the source’s IP address. Filtering 
in this way restricts the flow of packets based on the source IP address of the packets, 
without having to consider what protocols are involved. However, all the information in 
the header could be used to do packet filtering. It should noted that while the source IP 
address is a popular choice for packet filtering, any or all of the information in the 
packet header may be used. This makes the Silicon Firewall can handle IP source 
address masquerading. Also, in the future the dynamic CAM will handle this issue 
better. 
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 Chapter 3 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE SYSTEM CODESIGN 
The background of Internet security and Internet firewall security systems were 
presented in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 respectively. Since the Silicon Firewall system is 
an embedded system, and the design of the Silicon Firewall is a hardware-software 
codesign, before introducing the design issues of the Silicon Firewall system, some 
background of embedded system and hardware-software codesign are given. Since the 
microprocessor is the common component between the hardware-software codesign 
processes, background information on embedded processor and embedded processor 
Programmable Logic Device (PLD) solutions are given. Finally, the Altera® 
Excalibur™ embedded processor programmable solutions are presented as the solution 
that was used in the Silicon Firewall system design. 
3.1  Embedded System Overview 
The Silicon Firewall system is an embedded real-time system. Embedded systems are 
quite diverse; no one statement applies to all cases. Basically, embedded systems are 
built to constantly respond to external events and to generate control outputs as a 
function of their current state and inputs from sensors, etc..  
Embedded-system specification and design consists of two tasks, the first is describing 
a system’s desired functionality; the second is mapping that functionality for 
implementation by a set of system components such as processors, FPGAs, memories, 
and buses [9]. Ever-increasing embedded-system design complexity combined with a 
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 very tight time-to-market window has revolutionized the embedded system design 
process. The concurrent design of hardware and software has displaced traditional 
sequential design. Further more, hardware and software design now begins before the 
system architecture is finalized. Requirement definitions and system specifications are 
developed by system architectures, customers, and marketing departments together [10]. 
Embedded computing is unique because it is a codesign problem where the hardware 
and software architecture should be designed simultaneously. 
3.2 Hardware-Software Codesign 
The practice of concurrent hardware-software design can significantly cut the cost and 
cycle to build digital systems for embedded real-time applications. It has been proved 
that the traditional hardware-first, software-last development process is difficult and 
costly [11]. The codesign approach speeds up the intuitively serial design process by 
developing hardware and software concurrently. It helps the embedded system 
designers meet the design and development deadlines.  
According to [12] 
 
“In hardware-software codesign designers consider trade-offs in the way 
hardware and software components of a system work together to exhibit 
a specified behavior, given a set of performance goals and an 
implementation technology. Because of a wide range of possible system 
structures and design goals, the hardware-software codesign problem 
takes on many forms. One type of codesign seeks to accelerate 
application software by extracting portions for implementation in 
hardware. Programmable hardware may take this type of software 
acceleration common even in general-purpose computing. In this case, 
the codesign problem entails characterizing hardware and software 
performance, identifying a hardware-software partition, transforming the 
functional description into such a partition, and synthesizing the resulting 
hardware and software. High-level (or behavioral) synthesis can produce 
hardware implementations for functions described in a high-level 
software language such as C.” 
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  The Silicon Firewall system belongs to this type, the system hardware was written in 
behavioral and register-transfer-level Verilog HDL, while the software was written in 
C.  
The processor is the only piece in common between the hardware-software codesign 
processes, whether it is a microprocessor/microcontroller or digital signal processor. 
That is to say the processor is the common link that bridges the gap between software 
and hardware design. 
3.3 System-on-a-Chip Design 
Today’s submicron fabrication technologies enable designers to put large numbers of 
device on a single microchip. Along with this capability, a vast choice of hardware and 
software components makes system design and validation increasingly complex. As 
system design grows increasingly complex, the use of predesigned components, such as 
general-purpose microprocessors, can simplify synthesized hardware.  
3.4 Embedded Processor PLD (Programmable Logic Device) Solutions 
As digital systems progress towards higher levels of integration, system designers 
benefit from lower development costs, shorter design cycles, increased performance, 
and lower power consumption. Functions once performed by multiple, individual 
devices are now combined into more capable, higher density devices, achieving higher 
integration at the device level. Additionally, greater time-to-market pressures and 
frequent changes in system specifications require an increase in design flexibility. In 
particular, two types of programmable, off-the-shelf components maintain flexibility 
and increase system integration: microprocessors (software) and programmable logic 
(hardware). 
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 Given the advantages above, the next logical step in system integration would be the 
combination of embedded processors and programmable logic. In addition to offering 
all of the traditional benefits of higher integration, embedded processor PLD solutions 
also provide unique advantages to the system designer because of the flexibility of 
programmable logic, it also give the system designer unprecedented freedom to 
determine which functions should be executed in software and which would benefit 
most from dedicated hardware. Table 3.1 compares the capabilities of embedded 
processor PLDs to other component-level solutions for system integration, such as 
application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and application specific standard 
products (ASSPs). 
Table 3.1 Component-Level Solutions for System Integration (after [13]) 
 ASICs ASSPs Embedded 
Processor PLDs
Level of System Integration High Moderate High 
Development Cost High Low Low 
Unit Cost Low Low Moderate 
Design Flexibility Low Low High 
Total Time to Market Long Moderate Short 
 
3.5 Altera® Excalibur™ Embedded Processor Programmable Solutions 
Altera® Excalibur™ embedded processor solutions provided the tools needed to 
integrate an entire system on a single programmable logic device (PLD). The Excalibur 
solutions help speed the development and shorten time-to-market for the embedded 
processor applications by offering the ARM®-based hard core (fixed architecture) 
embedded processors and Nios™ soft core (configurable architecture) embedded 
processors. Combined with programmable and memory, the Excalibur solutions give all 
the programmable solutions needed with single-chip integration.  
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 The advanced features of Excalibur Solutions include: 
• 200-MHz high performance RISC (Reduce Instruction Set Computer) processor 
• Support for a wide range of end applications 
• Integrated hardware and software development workflow  
• Optimized integration with Altera device architectures 
3.6 Soft Core vs. Hard Core 
The arguments for both soft and hard core processor implementation in PLDs are 
convincing [13]. Flexibility, scalability, and low absolute cost are offered by soft cores. 
Many applications that require moderate performance are fit by the soft cores, and they 
immediately benefit from process enhancements to their target hardware platform. On 
the other hand, maximum performance and cost effectiveness are offered by hard core 
processors, primarily for applications that require high performance. The Nios 
processor’s parameterizability allows users to make the performance/cost tradeoff 
quickly, without needing to be a processor architect. Regardless of the configuration, 
the same instruction set allows Altera to deliver fully-verified cores and industry-
standard software development tools such as C/C++ compilers [13].  The leading-edge, 
32-bit RISC processor performance and substantial system RAM are offered by the 
ARM-and MIPS-based products, integrated with industry-leading programmable logic 
architectures. These products bring the performance, memory capacity and gate density 
normally associated with ASICs within the reach of every software or hardware 
designer. Table 3.2 outlines the difference between the soft core and hard core 
Excalibur product families. 
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 Table 3.2 Excalibur Product Comparison (after [13]) 
 Nios 
(Soft Core) 
ARM-&MIPS-Based 
(Hard Core) 
Flexibility High Moderate 
Performance 
 
Moderate High 
Multiprocessor 
Implementation 
Yes No 
Processor Enhancement 
Benefit 
Immediately Requires Mask Change 
 
3.7 Excalibur Workflow 
The Excalibur solutions are supported by a complete design workflow, which automates 
system design, incorporating familiar hardware and software (C/C++ code) 
methodologies [13]. 
All the tools necessary to develop Excalibur designs are provided by Altera, including 
an industry-standard C/C++ compiler and debugger, peripherals, and drivers, the 
Quartus™ II software for PLD design development, and download cables for device 
programming and verification. These tools provide a system-centric approach to 
development and allow hardware and software to be created concurrently. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the Excalibur workflow. 
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Figure 3.1 The Excalibur Workflow (after [13]) 
3.8 Silicon Firewall System 
Figure 3.2 is a simple diagram of the Silicon Firewall system. Basically in this hardware 
software codesign, the software and hardware are split as follows: the software does the 
initialization and configuration; the hardware does packet filtering. Using software to do 
configuration is easier, while using hardware to do packet filtering is faster, that is the 
reasons for splitting software and hardware in this way. 
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Figure 3.2 A Simple Diagram of The Silicon Firewall System 
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 Chapter 4 ALTERA NIOS EMBEDDED PROCESSOR  
The Altera Nios™ soft core embedded processor was selected in the Silicon Firewall 
system based on the advantages of soft core processors described in section 3.6. The 
Nios processor will be introduced in more detail in this chapter. The Nios Development 
Kit (NDK) and the Nios Ethernet Development Kit (NEDK) are also presented. The 
Nios development board and the daughter card are introduced.  
4.1 Nios Embedded Processor Overview 
The Nios® embedded processor is a user-configurable, general-purpose RISC embedded 
processor [14]. It was designed to be a flexible and powerful processor solution. The 
ease-of-use and flexibility make the Nios processor's one of the most popular embedded 
processors in the world. Custom processor-based systems can be created using the 
SOPC Builder system development tool. One or more configurable Nios CPUs can be 
integrated by the SOPC Builder into an FPGA with any number of standard peripherals, 
“gluing” the system together with the automatically generated Avalon™ switch fabric. 
The Nios embedded processor is optimized for system-on-a-programmable-chip 
(SOPC) integration and Altera® programmable logic. The Nios processor and user 
logic can be combined together and programmed into an FPGA using SOPC Builder. 
The Nios embedded processor’s unique features such as custom instructions and the 
simultaneous multi-master Avalon switch fabric make it different from other soft core 
processor solutions. These features provide simple, yet non-traditional methods to 
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 accelerate and optimize the designs. Table 4.1 shows a comparison of the 32-bit and 16-
bit Nios embedded processors in typical configurations. 
Table 4.1 Comparisons of Typical Nios Processor Configurations (after [14]) 
Feature 32-Bit Nios CPU 16-Bit Nios CPU 
Data bus size (bits) 32 16 
Arithmetic logic unit (ALU) width (bits) 32 16 
Internal register width (bits) 32 16 
Address bus size (bits) 32 16 
Instruction size (bits) 16 16 
Logic elements (LEs) (typical) Fewer than 1,500 Fewer than 1,000 
fMAX Over 125 MHz Over 125 MHz 
 
4.2 The Nios Soft Core Embedded Processor 
The Nios embedded processor is the first RISC processor soft core to be developed 
specially for programmable logic and can provide up to 50MIPS (Million Instructions 
Per Second) performance while being optimized for area in a PLD. Figure 4.1 shows a 
block diagram of the Nios embedded processor. 
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Figure 4.1 Block Diagram of the Nios Embedded Processor (after [13]) 
4.3 Nios Processor and Peripherals 
An address map with different types, widths, and speeds of memory and peripherals can 
be designed using a simple interface. The interface logic that connects all Nios 
peripherals as defined by the user is generated by the interface. Figure 4.2 diagrams the 
communication between the Nios embedded processor and the peripherals. The 
interface to each is specified as peripherals are added. The interface creates a peripheral 
bus module (PBM) according to the configuration specified. 
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Figure 4.2 Nios Processor and Peripherals (after [15]) 
4.4 Nios Development Kit  
Altera's Nios® development kit provides everything needed for system-on-a-
programmable-chip (SOPC) development.  
This kit includes: 
• Nios embedded processor configurable CPU soft core 
• Library of standard microprocessor peripherals 
• SOPC Builder system development tool  
• GNUPro compiler and debugger from Red Hat  
• Quartus® II Limited Edition development software  
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 • Nios development board populated by an APEX™ 20KE device 
(EP20K200EFC484)  
• Multiple SOPC reference designs targeted to the Nios development board  
4.4.1 Nios Peripheral Library 
The Nios® embedded processor development kits include a library of standard 
peripherals that are available for use in Altera® programmable logic. These peripherals 
are provided to the user as Verilog HDL or VHDL source code and include all of the 
necessary software routines for easy system integration. The Nios peripheral library 
(Verilog or VHDL code) includes the peripherals listed in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Nios Peripheral Library (after [16]) 
Peripheral Description 
UART Common serial interface; with variable baud rate, parity, stop and data bits, and optional flow control signals 
Timer 32-bit timer; can be used as periodic pulse generator or system watchdog timer 
Parallel I/O (PIO) 1- to 32-bit parallel I/O (input, output, and edge-capture) 
Serial Peripheral 
Interface (SPI) Serial peripheral interface, 3-wire, master/slave 
Direct Memory 
Access (DMA) 
The DMA peripheral allows for efficient bulk data transfer 
between peripherals and memory by removing the CPU from 
the data path 
Memory Interfaces 
• On-chip ROM and RAM  
• Off-chip SDRAM and SSRAM, SRAM, and flash  
• Off-chip Altera serial configuration device  
Ethernet Port 
• 10 Mbps Cirrus Logic CS8900A PHY/MAC chip 
• Interfaces supported by Plugs Ethernet Library  
Interface to User 
Logic 
Used to easily connect on-chip user logic or off-chip devices 
to an SOPC Builder-generated system 
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 4.4.2 Development Tools 
All the necessary tools for effective embedded system development are contained in the 
Nios development kit. The NDK comprises the two kits previously known as the HDK 
(Hardware Development Kit) and the SDK (Software Development Kit). The HDK is 
used to create Nios embedded processor systems in APEX devices. The HDK consists 
of the Altera's SOPC Builder tool and the Quartus II development software that 
combine to create a hardware development tool flow. On the software side, the SDK 
allows compile, run, debug C and assembly language programs on the Nios embedded 
processors. Altera has chosen the GNUPro toolkit, which is a popular and well-known 
suite of embedded software development tools.  
The reader is referred to appendix D for more information about the three components 
of NDK: SOPC Builder system development tool, Quartus II development software and 
GNUPro Toolkit Compiler and Debugger. 
4.5 Nios Development Board 
The Altera Excalibur development board [14] is an advanced and integrated solution for 
creating embedded processor applications. It contains the following things:  
• An APEX EP20K200E programmable device 
•  8 Mbits (512K x 16) of on board Flash RAM 
•  Two 1 Mbit (64K x 16) on board SRAM devices 
•  An RS-232 communication port 
•  A JTAG port 
• A parallel port 
•  Multiple expansion ports 
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 •  Two LEDs 
•  Two 7-Segment displays 
• miscellaneous other switches and components 
 Figure 4.3 shows a diagram of the Excalibur board. 
 
Figure 4.3 Nios Development Board (from [14]) 
The default Nios soft core processor can be loaded into the Altera FPGA, which 
contains a 16 bit instruction set, and the data bus is capable of operating with a 16 or 32 
bit. It can perform 50 million instructions per second with one instruction per clock 
cycle. 
The two internal SRAM devices can be used with 16 or 32 bit applications, the 16 bit is 
smaller, while the 32 bit is faster, thus in this research project the 32 bit data path is 
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 selected. A 144-pin SODIMM memory expansion socket is also provided on the board 
if needed. Both the Nios processor and the APEX™ device share the flash memory. 
The flash memory is organized as follows: 
Table 4.3 Flash Memory Configurations (after [14]) 
Flash Address Size Comments 
0x1C00000 – 0x1FFFFF 256Kbyte Factory-default APEX 
configuration 
0x180000 – 0x1BFFFF 256 Kbyte User-defined APEX 
configuration data 
 
0x100000 – 0x17FFFF 512 Kbyte 
 
Nios instruction and 
nonvolatile data space 
 
 
There is a factory programmed controller chip on the board, which is a MAX7054 
device that loads data from the flash and clocks it into the APEX device. The beginning 
address for the user-defined configurations is 0x180000; for factory default the starting 
address is 0x1C0000. 
The Excalibur board provides 5 volt and 3.3 volt daughter cards for the purposes of 
expansion. Three connectors are provided for 5-volt cards: a 40-pin connector (JP11), a 
20-pin connector (JP13), and a 14-pin connector (JP12). The same applies to 3.3-volt 
cards, using JP8, JP10, and JP9, respectively. 
There are three programmable devices on the Excalibur board: the APEX device, the 
configuration controller, and the PCI Mezzanine Card (PMC) (devices for JNC1 and 
JNC2). SW8, SW9, and SW10 determine the ability to program each respectively. The 
corresponding device is added to the JTAG chain if a switch is positioned to the left 
(marked connect on the board); the device will be removed from the chain if each 
switch positioned to bypass. 
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 SW1-SW7 are the seven remaining switches on the board. SW1 is an eight-pin user 
defined DIPswitch. SW2 is a special button used for resetting the board. The 
configuration controller reloads the flash memory into the APEX device upon a reset. 
SW3 is defined by the configuration controller (a CPU reset by factory default), which 
is the clear function. SW4-SW7 are user defined and may perform any function 
necessary. When pressed, the logic zero signals are provided. 
On the Excalibur board there are two clocks for use. The first one is provided by an 
onboard oscillator, which is a 33.3333 MHz signal. The second one can be used to 
allow the user to create the clock, utilizing the phase locked loop circuitry on the board. 
In this research project, the first one is used. 
4.6 Nios Ethernet Development Kit  
The Nios Ethernet Development Kit (NEDK)[17] is an add-on to the Nios Development 
Board. It includes a daughter card with an Ethernet interface chip, and make this 
peripheral available to Nios system built with Quartus.  
The Nios Ethernet Development Kit includes hardware and software components that 
provide network connectivity for the Nios-based embedded systems. The components 
included in this kit are (according to [17]): 
• A network-interface daughter card that can plug directly into the Nios 
development board. 
• An SOPC Builder library component that defines the logic and interface signals 
necessary to use the daughter card in a Nios system. 
• A C language library that provides a network-protocol stack. This library 
includes support for raw Ethernet, address resolution protocol (ARP), Internet 
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 protocol (IP), Internet control message protocol (ICMP), user datagram protocol 
(UDP), and transmission control protocol (TCP) protocols and utility routines 
for controlling the daughter card hardware. 
APEX™ device hardware reference designs and example software application programs 
are included in this kit. These reference designs and application examples can be used 
as starting points to be modified for the specific network-enabled application.  
The following items are included in the Nios EDK: 
• Nios EDK daughter card based on the Cirrus Logic CS8900A PHY/MAC chip 
• Cabling 
• Nios EDK CD-ROM 
The Nios EDK CD-ROM contains the following files (according to [17]): 
• SOPC library components 
• PC-board schematic and layout files for the Nios EDK daughter card 
• Example hardware reference design configurations: 
- Nios 32-bit CPU for a single daughter card 
- Nios 16-bit CPU for a single daughter card 
- Nios 32-bit for dual-stacked daughter cards 
• Example software applications: 
- Library general demonstration and configuration programs 
- Example web server 
- Nios 32-bit CPU network-based GERMS monitor application example 
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 4.7 Nios EDK Daughter Card 
The Nios EDK daughter card is a circuit board with the following components 
(according to [17]): 
• A Cirrus Logic CS8900A integrated Ethernet 10Mbit PHY/MAC chip 
• A RJ-45 network connector with integrated-transformer magnetics and    
Link/LAN LEDs 
• A 20 MHz crystal oscillator that is used by the CS8900A chip 
Figure 4.4 shows the picture of the daughter card. 
 
Figure 4.4 Nios EDK Daughter Card (from [17]) 
The CS8900A integrated PHY/MAC chip is a main functional component on the Nios 
EDK daughter card. An ISA-bus interface (not used in this research) is presented to the 
Nios CPU by the CS8900A. The set of female connectors provides the necessary 
electrical-interface signals. These connectors are compatible with the expansion 
connector groups on the Nios development board. The Nios EDK daughter card is 
compatible with either the 5-V (JP11, JP12, JP13) or the 3.3-V (JP8, JP9, JP10) 
expansion connector groups. The daughter card does not use any 5-V signals. 
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 4.8 Plugs Library 
The Plugs Library is a software library included in the Nios EDK. It allows the software 
to use standard network protocols for transmitting and receiving data. The features of 
the plugs library are as follows (according to [17]): 
• Access to low-level packets 
• Access to high level-packet payloads 
• Conforms to RFCs 
• Allows opening connections and sending data with only a few lines of   code 
• Is similar to the Unix-standard sockets routines 
• Each plug can be set to print debug information for either transmit or receive 
data 
The protocols supported by the plugs library are (according to [17]): 
• Raw Ethernet 
• Address resolution protocol (ARP) 
• Internet protocol (IP) 
• Internet control message protocol (ICMP) 
• User datagram protocol (UDP) 
• Transmission control protocol (TCP) 
Figure 4.5 shows the relationships between the library-supported Nios EDK protocols. 
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Figure 4.5 Plugs Library-Supported Nios EDK Protocols (after [17]) 
The Ethernet and 802.3 packets are supported by the Nios EDK. Ethernet packets are 
sent and received by the library routines to and from arbitrary 48-bit Ethernet media 
access control (MAC) address. Higher level protocols (such as ICMP, UDP, and TCP) 
use Ethernet transparently. 
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 Chapter 5 SILICON FIREWALL DESIGN  
In this chapter, the Silicon Firewall design is presented in detail. Details of the CAM 
and the CS8900A are discussed since they are the two major peripherals of the Nios 
CPU in the Silicon Firewall. 
5.1 Introduction to CS8900A 
The CS8900A [18] is a low-cost Ethernet Local Area Network (LAN) Controller that is 
optimized for Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) Personal Computers. It is a single 
chip, full-duplex, Ethernet solution, incorporating all of the analog and digital circuitry 
needed for a complete Ethernet circuit. The CS8900A, the most complicated peripheral 
in the Silicon Firewall system, will be introduced in this section. 
5.1.1 General Description 
Major functional blocks of the CS8900A [18] include: a direct ISA-bus interface, an 
802.3 Media Access Control (MAC) engine, integrated buffer memory, a serial 
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) interface, and a 
complete analog front end with both 10BASE-T and AUI (Attachment Unit Interface). 
The CS8900A must be configured before it can perform its two basic functions, 
Ethernet packet transmission and reception. Various parameters such as Memory Base 
Address, Ethernet Physical Address, frame types to receive, and which media interface 
to use must be written to its internal Configuration and Control registers. There are two 
methods to do the configuration, the first is using the host to write the configuration 
 54
 data to CS8900A across the ISA bus (or direct using register addressing) or to load the 
data automatically from an external EEPROM. 
The Silicon Firewall uses direct register addressing (I/O) mode to configure the 
CS8900A. 
5.1.2 Frame Encapsulation and Decapsulation 
After configuration is complete, operation can begin. All aspects of Ethernet frame 
transmission and reception are handled by the CS8900A’s MAC engine, which is fully 
compliant with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.3 
Ethernet standard (ISO/IEC 8802-3,1993) and supports full-duplex operation. 
The main functions of the MAC are: frame encapsulation and decapsulation, error 
detection and handling, and, media access management. It assembles transmit packets 
and disassembles receive packets automatically. 
For transmission, when the proper number of bytes has been transferred to the 
CS8900A’s memory (either 5, 381, 1021 bytes, or 1518 bytes), and providing that 
access to the network is permitted, the MAC automatically transmits the 7-byte 
preamble (1010101b…), followed by the Start-of-Frame Delimiter (SFD, 10101011b), 
and then the serialized data.  
For reception, the MAC receives the incoming packet as a serial stream of Non-Return 
to Zero (NRZ) data. Then it checks for the SFD. If the SFD is detected, the MAC 
assumes all subsequent bits are frame data. The Destination Address (DA) is read and 
compared to the criteria programmed into the address filter by the MAC. The frame is 
loaded into the CS8900A’s memory if the DA passes the address filter. Figure 5.1 
shows the format of Ethernet frame. 
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  Packet 
                                                                 Frame      
           Up to 7 bytes        1 byte   6 bytes  6 bytes       2 bytes                                                        4 bytes                          
 
  
 Alternating 1s/0s    SFD    DA     SA       length Field       LLC data        Pad     FCS 
              Preamble                                                  frame length 
Direction of Transmission 
Figure 5.1 Ethernet Frame Format (after [18]) 
5.1.3 Two Basic Functions 
As mentioned in section 5.1.1, the two basic functions of CS8900A are Ethernet packet 
transmission and reception. They will be briefly introduced in this section. 
1. Packet Transmission 
There are two phases in packet transmission. In the first phase, the Ethernet frame  is 
moved into the CS8900A’s buffer memory by the host. In the second phase of 
transmission, the frame is converted into an Ethernet packet then transmitted onto the 
network by the CS8900A. 
2. Packet Reception 
Like packet transmission, there are two phases in packet reception. In the first phase, an 
Ethernet packet is received and stored in on-chip memory by the CS8900A. In the 
second phase, the received frame is transferred across the ISA bus and into host 
memory by the host. An alternative to using ISA bus transfer is to use direct register 
addressing (I/O mode). 
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 5.1.4 CS8900A Operation Modes 
The receive frame can be transferred as Memory space operations, I/O space 
operations, or as DMA operations using host DMA (ISA bus).  
1 DMA Mode Operation 
A direct interface to ISA buses running at clock rates from 8 to 11 MHz is 
provided by CS8900A. Its on-chip bus drivers are able to deliver 24 mA of 
drive current, which allows the CS8900A to drive the ISA bus directly, without 
added external “glue logic”. 
In order to minimize missed frames, the ISA-bus operation below 8 MHz 
should use the CS8900A’s Receive DMA mode. 
2 Memory Mode Operation 
In Memory Mode operation, the CS8900A’s internal registers and frame buffers 
are mapped into a contiguous 4-Kbyte block of host memory, given that the host 
with direct access to the CS8900A’s internal registers and frame buffers. 
3 I/O Mode Operation 
In I/O Mode operation, the CS8900A is accessed through eight, 16-bit I/O ports, 
which are mapped into sixteen contiguous I/O locations in the host system’s I/O 
space. Being the default configuration for the CS8900A, the I/O Mode is always 
enabled. Table 5.1 illustrates I/O Mode mapping. 
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 Table 5.1 I/O Mode Mapping (after [18]) 
Offset Type Description 
0000h Read/Write Receive/Transmit Data (port 0) 
0002h Read/Write Receive/Transmit Data (port 1) 
0004h Write-only TxCMD (Transmit Command) 
0006h Write-only Txlength (Transmit Length) 
0008h Read-only Interrupt Status Queue 
000Ah Read/Write PacketPage Pointer 
000Ch Read/Write PacketPage Data (Port 0) 
000Eh Read/Write PacketPage Data (Port 1) 
 
I/O Mode is 99.6% as fast as Memory Mode [19]. Cirrus Logic recommends the use of 
I/O Mode since the CS8900A defaults to I/O and no glue logic is needed in most 
systems in I/O mode. I/O mode is used in the Silicon Firewall. 
5.1.5 PacketPage   
PacketPage is a unique, highly-efficient method of accessing internal registers and 
buffer memory, which the CS8900A architecture is based on. A unified way of 
controlling the CS8900A in Memory mode or I/O mode that minimizes CPU overhead 
and simplifies software is provided by PacketPage. 
Central to the CS8900A architecture is PacketPage memory, which is a 4-Kbyte page 
of integrated RAM. Transmit and receive frames are stored in PacketPage memory 
temporarily, also PacketPage memory is used for internal registers. Table 5.2 presents 
the user-accessible portion of the PacketPage memory. 
Table 5.2 The User-Accessible Portion of The PacketPage Memory (after [18]) 
PacketPage Address Contents 
0000h-0045h Bus Interface Registers 
0100h-013Fh Status and Control Registers 
0140h-014Fh Initiate Transmit Registers 
0150h-015Dh Address Filter Registers 
0400h Receive Frame Location 
0A00h Transmit Frame Location 
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 The following tables illustrate the packet page memory address map. 
Table 5.3 Bus Interface Registers (after [18]) 
PacketPage 
Address 
# of Bytes Type Description 
0000h 4 Read-only Product Identification Code 
0004h 28 - Reserved 
0020h 2 Read/Write I/O Base Address 
0022h 2 Read/Write Interrupt Number (0,1,2,3) 
0024h 2 Read/Write DMA Channel Number (0,1,2) 
0026h 2 Read/Only DMA Start of Frame 
0028h 2 Read-only DMA Frame Count (12 Bits) 
002Ah 2 Read-only RxDMA Byte Count 
002Ch 4 Read/Write Memory Base Address 
Register 
0030h 4 Read/Write Boot PROM Base Address 
0034h 4 Read/Write Boot PROM Address Mask 
0038h 8 - Reserved 
0040h 2 Read/Write EEPROM Command 
0042h 2 Read/Write EEPROM Data 
0044h 12 - Reserved 
0050h 2 Read only Received Frame Byte Counter 
0052h 174 - Reserved 
 
Table 5.4 Status and Control Registers (after [18]) 
PacketPage 
Address 
# of Bytes Type Description 
0100h 32 Read/Write Configuration&Control 
Registers (2 bytes per register) 
0120h 32 Read-only Status& Event Registers 
(2 bytes per register) 
0140h 4 - Reserved 
 
Table 5.5 Initiate Transmit Registers (after [18]) 
Packetpage 
Address 
# of Bytes Type Description 
0144h 2 Write-only TxCMD (transmit command) 
0146h 2 Write-only TxLength (transmit length) 
0148h 8 - Reserved 
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 Table 5.6 Address Filter Register (after [18]) 
PacketPage 
Address 
# of Bytes Type Description 
0150h 8 Read/Write Logical Address Filter 
0158h 6 Read/Write Individule Address 
015Eh 674 - Reserved 
 
Table 5.7 Frame Location (after [18]) 
PacketPage 
Address 
# of Bytes Type Description 
0400h 2 Read-only RXStatus 
0402h 2 Read-only RxLength 
0404h - Read-only Receive Frame Location 
0A00 - Write-only Transmit Frame Location 
 
5.2 Using Content-Addressable Memory as an IP Packet Filter 
An Internet Protocol (IP) packet filter is a security feature that prohibits unauthorized 
users from accessing local-area network (LAN) resources. IP traffic over a wide-area 
network (WAN) link can also be restricted by such a filter. LAN users can be restricted 
to specific applications on the Internet (such as e-mail) with an IP packet filter as well. 
A Silicon Firewall serves to filter packet traffic by checking to determine if a packet is 
to be permitted or denied according to the desired polices and rules. Given the traffic 
rates now in place, for the Silicon Firewall to be effective, it must operate at high 
speed. The content-addressable memory (CAM) technology is incorporated to the 
Silicon Firewall in order to meet this goal. 
5.3 Content-Addressable Memory  
In the Silicon Firewall system, CAM is used as a filter to block all accesses except for 
packets that have permission. The source addresses that have permission are stored in 
CAM; when a source address is presented to the CAM, the CAM reports whether it 
contains the source address [20]. The source address(es) residing within CAM have 
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 permission for a particular activity. Figure 5.2 shows an example of an IP filter where 
the ultimate action is to “pass” or “deny” the packet depending on the source address. 
                    CAM 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Data Address 
192.2.41.53 0 
192.63.12.3 1 
192.21.42.3 2 
      Packet Address                Status 
 
192.2.41.53 Pass 
 
192.21.42.3 Pass 
 
192.57.11.101 Denied 
 
        192.57.12.144               Denied 
Figure 5.2 Using CAM as an IP Filter (after [20]) 
5.3.1 CAM and Traditional Memory Devices 
Most memory devices address specific memory locations to store and retrieve data. For 
example, a system using RAM or ROM locates data by searching sequentially through 
memory. This technique can slow system performance because the search requires 
multiple clock cycles to complete. However, identifying stored data by content, rather 
than by its address can considerably reduce the time required finding an item stored in 
memory. CAM works in this way. CAM simultaneously compares the desired 
information against the entire list of pre-stored entries, so it offers a performance 
advantage over other memory search algorithms, such as binary-based searches, tree-
based searches, or lookaside tag buffers.  
RAM stores data at a particular address. Retrieving data from RAM, the system 
supplies the address and then receives the data. With CAM, the system supplies the 
data rather than the address, as shown in figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 CAM vs. RAM (after [20]) 
CAM takes one clock cycle to search through all memory locations in parallel to locate 
stored data and returns the data’s address. CAM provided by Altera drives a match flag 
high if the data is found, or low if the data is not found. 
5.3.2 Advantages of CAM 
A performance advantage is offered by CAM over other memory search algorithms, 
because it compares the desired information against the entire list of pre-stored entries 
simultaneously. CAM provides orders-of-magnitude reduction in the search time and 
helps much in data analysis and updating. Its typical match time is less than 10 ns for 
the Altera CAM megafunction. 
To better understand the performance advantages of using CAM, the total time required 
to search for an item using both RAM and CAM can be compared. Locating an item in 
a 32-word, 32-bit RAM block running at 125 MHz requires up to 256 ns, as 32 clock 
cycles of 8 ns each may be needed to find a match. In contrast, the total time required to 
find an item in a similar-sized CAM block is only 4 ns, or 1 clock cycle of 8 ns. In this 
example, CAM is 32 times fast as RAM and has a latency of one clock cycle compared 
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 to a maximum of 32 clock cycles for RAM [21]. Note that regardless of the size of the 
CAM, the latency is always one clock cycle. 
CAM is ideally suited for many applications, such as Ethernet address look-up, data 
compression, pattern recognition, cache tags, fast routing table look-up, high-
bandwidth address filtering, user privileges, and security and encryption information. 
5.3.3 Discrete CAM and Integrated CAM  
Currently, discrete CAM devices are mostly used for applications that require fast 
searches. It increases design time and reduces the amount of usable PCB (printed 
circuit board) space because designers have to add a separate CAM device to their 
printed circuit board (PCB). Discrete CAM also reduces system performance because 
of the introduction of additional on-chip and off-chip delays. However, reconfigurable 
devices containing on-chip CAM built into their embedded system blocks (ESBs) 
eliminate the disadvantages of discrete CAM. Altera on-chip CAM has an access time 
of 4 ns, however, the access time for a typical discrete CAM is 20 ns [20]. Because 
CAM is integrated inside an FPGA device, it provides faster system performance than 
traditional discrete CAM. In this project, there are 52 embedded system blocks (ESBs) 
in the Altera EP20K200E device, allowing a maximum of 53,248 CAM bits. In this 
project, 94% ESB bits are used, not only by the CAM, some ESB bits are used by other 
functions, such as the SignalTap embedded logic analyzer and the on-chip read only 
memory (ROM). There are large external CAMs available, for example, the SiberCAM 
[22] Ultra-2M is a CAM with 2,359,296 ternary storage elements. Up to 16 Ultra-2M 
devices can be connected together to provide increased storage depth without 
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 performance degradation in search datapath throughput. Table 5.8 shows the 
comparison of discrete CAM and APEX CAM. 
Table 5.8 Comparison of Discrete CAM & APEX CAM (after [20]) 
Feature Discrete CAM APEX CAM 
Access time 20 ns 4 ns 
System performance Multi-device solution 
28.2 ns 
Single-device solution 
4.9 ns 
 
5.3.4 The Altcam Megafunction 
CAM is implemented in the Quartus II software through the altcam megafunction. In 
order to describe how CAM works in the Silicon Firewall clearly, CAM is introduced 
in detail in this section. 
5.3.4.1 Symbol  
The symbol for the altcam megafunction is as below: 
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altcam 
 
pattern[] 
 
wrx[] 
wrxused[] 
wrdelete[] 
wraddress[] 
wren[] 
                                            maddress[]
inclock                                      mbits[]
inclocken                                 mfound
inaclr                                      mcount[]
 
mstart                                         rdbusy
mnext                                        wrbusy
 
outclock 
outclocken 
outaclr 
Figure 5.4 Symbol for The Altcam Megfunction (after [20]) 
5.3.4.2 Input Pins  
Table 5.9 describes the input pins of the altcam megafunction. 
Table 5.9 Input Pins of The Altcam Megafunction (after [20]) 
Port Name 
 
Require Description Notes 
pattern [] Yes Input data pattern for 
searching or writing. 
Input port WIDTH wide. 
wrx [] No Pattern “don’t care” 
bits (indicated with 
1s), for writing only. 
Input port WIDTH wide. 
wrxused No Indicates whether 
wrx[] should be used. 
If false, writing takes two clock 
cycles to complete; if true, 
writing takes three clock cycles. 
If asserted during a write cycle, 
the value of the wrx [] port is 
used. Otherwise, the value of the 
wrx[] port has no effect. 
wrdelete No Indicates that the 
pattern at wraddress [] 
Deleting a pattern takes two clock 
cycles; pattern [], wrx[], and 
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 should be deleted. wrxused are ignored during delete 
cycles. 
wraddress[] No Address for writing. Input port WIDTHAD wide. 
wren No Write enable. Assert wren to start to a write or 
delete operation. De-assert wren 
for a read (match) operation. 
inclock Yes Clock for most inputs.  
inclocken  No Clock enable for 
inclock. 
 
inaclr No Asynchronous clear 
for registers that use 
inclock. 
 
mstart No Multi-match mode 
only: indicates that a 
new CAM read is 
starting and forces 
maddress [] to first 
match. 
This port is not available for 
single-match mode but reauired 
for multiple-match modes. In fast 
multiple-match mode, this port is 
required if the mnext port is used. 
mnext No Multi-match mode 
only: advances 
maddress [] to next 
match. 
This port is not available for 
single-match mode. 
outclock No Clock for mstart, 
mnext, and outputs. 
Used only if 
“OUTPUT_REG=OUTCLOCK”. 
If 
“OUTPUT_REG=UNREGISTER
ED” or “INCLOCK” this port 
must remain unconnected. 
outclocken No Clock enable for 
outclock. 
Used only if 
“OUTPUT_REG=OUTCLOCK”. 
If 
“OUTPUT_REG=UNREGISTER
ED” or “INCLOCK” this port 
must remain unconnected. 
outaclr No Asynchronous clear 
for registers that use 
outclock. 
 
 
5.3.4.3 Output Pins  
Table 5.10 describes the output pins of the altcam megafunction. 
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Table 5.10 Output Pins of The Altcam Megafunction (after [20]) 
Port 
 
Required Description Comments 
maddress[] No Encoded address of 
current match. 
Output port WIDTHAD wide. One 
of the output ports must be used. 
Altera recommends using ether a 
combination of the maddress[] and 
mfound output ports, or the mbits [] 
output port. 
mbits[] No Address of the found 
match. 
Output port with width 
[NUMWORDS-1..0]. One of the 
output ports must be present. Altera 
recommends using either a 
combination of the maddress [] and 
mfound output ports, or the mbits [] 
output port. 
mfound No Indicates at least one 
match. 
Used with the maddress[] port. One 
of the output ports must be present. 
Altera recommends using either a 
combination of the maddress [] and 
mfound output ports, or the mbits [] 
output port. 
mcount[] No Total number of 
matches. 
Output port WIDTHAD wide. One 
of the output ports must be present. 
Altera recommends using either a 
output ports, or the mbits [] output 
port. 
rdbusy No Indicates that read 
input ports must hold 
their current value. 
One of the output ports must be 
present. 
wrbusy No Indicates that write 
input ports must hold 
their current value. 
One of the output ports must be 
present. 
 
As mentioned previously, to accomplish packet filtering, a set of rules has to set up to 
specify what types of packets (e.g., those to or from a particular IP address or port) are 
to be allowed and what types are to be blocked. Since CAM is used to do the packet 
filtering in this project, we need to write the reference source address patterns into and 
then read the match results from CAM. 
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 5.3.4.4 Writing Patterns into CAM 
CAM can be pre-loaded with data either during configuration, or during 
systemoperation. In most cases, writing each word into CAM takes two clock cycles 
[20]. The “don’t care” bits can be written into CAM words and bits set to “don’t care” 
do not affect matching. A third clock cycle is required if “don’t care” bits are used [20]. 
5.3.4.5 Reading from CAM 
Altera CAM operates in one of three different modes: single-match mode, multiple-
match mode, and fast multiple-match mode. In each mode, the matched data’s location 
is outputted by an ESB as an encoded or unencoded address. In an encoded output, the 
address of the matched data is indicated. In an unencoded output, each output 
represents one word of the CAM block. The corresponding address is a match if an 
output goes high (e.g., if the data is located in address 14, the fourteenth output line 
goes high). 
Single match mode is more suited for designs without duplicate data in the memory. If 
multiple locations in the memory contain the same data, CAM should be used in 
multiple-match or fast multiple-match mode. In these two modes, CAM supports 
multiple-match data and the ESB outputs the locations of the matched data as an 
encoded or unencoded addresses. Also, the CAM only takes one clock cycle to acquire 
outputs in single match mode, while in multiple-match mode two clock cycles are 
needed and fast multiple match while taking one clock cycle need twice as much ESB 
memory. Since there are no duplicate patterns in the Silicon Firewall, and speed and 
size are important, the single match mode is used in this project. 
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 5.4 Silicon Firewall Hardware Mode 
The hardware design is based on the Nios version 1.1 reference design. Basically, the 
hardware mode extracts the source IP address and uses a CAM to perform an address 
match. 
5.4.1 Source IP Address Extraction 
As mentioned previously, the source IP address is the policy of packet filtering in this 
research project, so source IP address extraction is the important part in this design. In 
this section, extraction of the source IP address will be discussed. 
5.4.1.1 CS8900A 
In software mode, the CS8900A is configured to interrupt mode. The interrupt signal 
from the CS8900A is very important in the hardware design, since all the actions are 
based on this signal. In the reference design, this signal is connected to the Nios CPU. 
In the Silicon Firewall system, it is connected to one of the Verilog modules. The 
function of this Verilog module is to read the incoming packet and extract the source IP 
address. It outputs this IP address to the CAM to perform an address match. This 
module communicates with both the CS8900A and the CAM megafunction. 
The CS8900A is one of the peripherals for the Nios CPU in the reference design, so all 
the pins are set up already, based on that usage. The Verilog module uses all these pins 
to communicate with CS8900A, and no more pins are necessary. 
When there is an interrupt, the hardware first reads a special register (the ISQ register) 
to cause the interrupt pin to go low. However, the interrupt pin will remain low until the 
null word (0000h) is read from the ISQ register, or for 1.6 us, whichever is longer. In 
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 order to make sure the Silicon Firewall will not miss any packets, the first method (null 
word from ISQ) must be used.  
5.4.1.2 Source IP Address Generation 
Three things are considered in the source IP address generation part of the design: 
1. The source IP address is the only thing needed to make a decision, so reading 
the whole packet is not necessary. 
2. The packet data is made of header and data, and the format of the header is 
fixed (see Chapter 2). The method used in this design is to count the bytes. 
3. The two sets of 16-bit data are combined together to form a 32-bit IP address. 
5.4.2 CAM  
The function of CAM in this design is to do address matching, so both writing and 
matching CAM operations are needed. In software mode, the Nios CPU stores IP 
addresses in CAM  (write); in hardware mode, the previously described Verilog module 
feeds the extracted IP address to CAM (matching).  
Since the IP address is 32-bit, a 32 bit*32 words CAM is built through the Megawizard 
tool in Quartus II. It is then added to the system as a peripheral of the Nios CPU. In this 
design, since there are no don’t care bits written into CAM, only four inputs are needed 
to write the IP address: inclock, pattern, wren, wraddress. Three outputs pins are used: 
outclock, maddress and mfound. The inclock and the outclock are same. Both of them 
are from the Altera APEX board (33.3333 MHz). 
5.4.2.1 mfound 
mfound is one of the outputs from CAM. It is used to indicate if there is a match. In the 
Silicon Firewall system, if mfound goes high, it means a packet with the authorized 
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 source IP address has arrived. In this case, the whole packet’s data is wanted. The 
mfound signal is used to interrupt the Nios CPU to process the packet data.  
In order to make sure mfound interrupts the Nios CPU properly (only goes high when 
there is a desired packet) two more input signals are added to CAM: inclocken and 
outclocken. When the Nios CPU initializes CAM, only the inclocken is high 
(activated). After the initialization, both of these two clock enable signals are set to 
high. Thus enables the CAM to perform source IP address matching.  
5.4.3 Packet Data Transfer 
In this design, both the Nios CPU and the hardware communicate with the CS8900A, 
and both the Nios CPU and the hardware communicate with the CAM. However, two 
signals cannot be connected to an output pin or input pin directly. Therefore there are 
two situations to deal with in the data transfer in this system. 
1. For the data bus of the CS8900A, two bi-directional, tri-state buffers are used, 
one is for the Nios CPU and the other one is for the hardware. 
2. For the other pins of the CS8900A and the “pattern” input pin of CAM, a bus 
multiplexer is used. 
5.5 Silicon Firewall Software Mode 
In the Silicon Firewall system, there are two operating modes: software mode and 
hardware mode. In this section, the software mode is introduced. 
As mentioned in section 3.8, basically the software mode does initialization and 
configuration. Other than that, since there are two modes in this system, the task of 
switching between the software mode and hardware mode is done by the software.  
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 5.5.1 Initialization 
In order to make the Silicon Firewall system work properly, various parameters have to 
be written to the peripherals. In this specific system, there are two peripherals that need 
to be initialized, the CS8900A and the CAM. 
5.5.1.1 CS8900A Initialization 
The Silicon Firewall system design uses the example hardware Nios 32-bit CPU 
reference design for a single daughter card in the Nios EDK CD-ROM as the starting 
point. In the reference design, the CS8900A has been connected to the Nios CPU and 
configured already. After loading the reference design to the Altera FPGA, the Nios 
CPU can communicate with the CS8900A by running the example source file. In the 
SDK of the reference design, the “lib” folder contains the C program that initialized the 
CS8900A.  
In the Silicon Firewall design, the configuration of the CS8900A was changed. There 
are two differences between the reference design configuration and Silicon Firewall 
system configuration. 
1. In the reference design, the interrupt pin is not activated in the configuration 
program. However the interrupt from the CS8900A is a very important signal 
for the hardware in the Silicon Firewall system, so additional configuration data 
are written into the internal registers of the CS8900A to enable the interrupt pin. 
2. In the reference design, the CS8900A is configured for promiscuous mode, in 
which case it will accept all receive frames, irrespective of DA (Destination 
Address). In the Silicon Firewall system, the CS8900A is configured for only 
broadcast mode and individual address mode. When the individual address 
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 mode is set, frames with a DA that matches the individual address are accepted, 
while in broadcast mode, all broadcast frames are accepted. This last mode is 
necessary since broadcast frame are required in a number of protocols (i.e. Ping 
command using the ICMP protocol). 
5.5.1.2 CAM Initialization 
The CAM is another important peripheral in the Silicon Firewall system (see figure 
3.2). CAM can be used to accelerate a variety of applications such as local-area 
networks (LANs), database management, file-storage management, table look up, 
pattern recognition, artificial intelligence, fully associative and processor-specific cache 
memories, and disk cache memories [20].  In the Silicon Firewall system, CAM is used 
to do address matching. In order to do that, the CAM has to be initialized, that is to say 
some data has to be stored in the CAM in advance. In this research project design, the 
Nios CPU writes a set of data (Source IP addresses) in the CAM before the operation of 
the system. 
A CAM megafunction is built through the MegaWizard in Quartus II, and then it is 
added to the system. Since the CAM is a complex peripheral, 48 parallel I/O 
(input/output) pins are used to make the CAM work properly. 
5.5.2 Polling vs. Interrupt 
This design used Nios version 1.1 to begin with. The reference design is also 1.1-based. 
However the 1.1-based designs have a problem with the interrupt circuitry. The 
interrupt arrives at the Nios core asynchronous to the main CLK (clock) signal, causing 
occasional spurious interrupts to other values than the assigned interrupt (irq) number.  
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 However, in the Silicon Firewall design, the Nios CPU is not intended to read all the 
packet data, only the packet data with the permitted source IP address is read. In that 
case, a signal from CAM will interrupt the Nios CPU, thus the interrupt feature of the 
Nios CPU is very important for this design. Fortunately, the Nios 2.0 core fixes this 
with a D-Flip-Flop between the CS8900A and the Nios, clocked by CLK and 
implements this fix internally. 
Accordingly, there is a major change in the plugs library in Nios 2.0 CPU. That is the 
plugs library may now be run with interrupts enabled, polling is no longer necessary. 
From an CPU efficiency stand point this is very desirable. 
5.5.3 Mode Switching 
As mentioned previously, this design is a hardware and software codesign, so another 
concern is how to make the hardware and software work together properly and 
efficiently. After splitting the function of hardware and software in this system, a 
method to switch between hardware mode and software mode has to be provided. In 
this design, two PIOs (parallel input/output) are used to do this. One of the PIOs is 
defined as output by the Nios CPU and is connected to related hardware to make the 
hardware work correctly. The Nios CPU uses this signal as a control signal to switch 
between hardware mode and software mode. The other PIO is defined as input by the 
Nios CPU. In reality this input PIO is connected to the output PIO. The reason for 
doing this is as follows: the output PIO is used to control the hardware, however that is 
not enough since the Nios CPU will do different things in different modes. That is to 
say the Nios CPU has to “know” which mode it is in before it does something as 
requested. 
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 After the interrupt is enabled in the Nios 2.0 CPU, there is an interrupt handler in the 
“lib” folder in the reference design. The interrupt service routine will check for events 
and dispatch packet when there is an interrupt. However, there are two modes in the 
Silicon Firewall design, so before the interrupt service routine does something, the 
current mode has to be determined. The input PIO is used to do this. 
5.5.4 Flow Chart 
The following is the flow chart of the software mode. In this figure, “Hw” means 
hardware mode, “Sw” means software mode. 
The Silicon Firewall system uses software mode to begin with. After the system 
initialization, the Silicon Firewall is ready to function. In the flow chart, the interrupt 
could come from two places, the first one is directly from the CS8900A; the second one 
is from the Silicon Firewall system hardware when there is an authorized packet 
coming in.  
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Figure 5.5 Software Mode Flow Chart 
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 5.6 Silicon Firewall Design 
Based on the introduction to the CS8900A and the CAM, the implementation in the 
Silicon Firewall system will now be introduced in detail. 
5.6.1 Nios System to Daughter Card Pin Map 
Each Ethernet Interface (CS8900A) peripheral in the Nios system will have an 
associated set of I/O pins on the system module. This section describes how to connect 
the daughter card to the system-module I/O pins. In general, these connections are 
established by making pin-assignments in the PLD design. The Silicon Firewall design 
just uses the pin-assignment included in the reference designs that it is based on. 
The names given to the system-module I/O ports will depend on the name for the 
Ethernet Interface (CS8900A) peripheral. In Tables 5.11, <your_name> indicates the 
name assigned to this component, in the Silicon Firewall system it is “enet”. The name 
for some system-module I/O ports will also depend on the tri-state bus selected for this 
peripheral. In Tables 5.11, <your_bus_name> indicates the name of the bus assigned to 
this Ethernet Interface (CS8900A) peripheral, in the Silicon Firewall it is 
“nedk_card_bus”. 
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 Table 5.11 Nios 32-bit CPU System Module I/O Port Name and Daughter Card 
Pin Name (after [17]) 
32-bit CPU System Module I/O Port 
Name 
Daughter Card Pin Name 
(Lower of Two Stacked Cards) 
<your_bus_name>_data SD [15..0] 
<your_bus_name>_address[4] SA [3] 
<your_bus_name>_address[3] SA [2] 
<your_bus_name>_address[2] SA [1] 
<your_bus_name>_byteenablen[1] SHBE_n 
ior_n_to_the <your_name> IOR_n (lower) 
iow_n_to_the <your_name> IOW_n (lower) 
irq_to_the_<your_name> INTRQ0 (lower) 
~(system module reset_n) RESET 
Constant Logic-1 MEMW_n 
Constant Logic-1 MEMR_n 
Constant Logic-1 SA [9..8] 
Constant Logic-0 SA [11..10] 
Constant Logic-0 SA [7..4] 
Constant Logic-0 SA [0] 
Constant Logic-0 CHIPSEL_n (lower) 
Constant Logic-0 CHIPSEL_n (upper) 
 
The descriptions for these pins are as follows (according to [18]): 
SD [0:15]: System Data Bus, Bi-Directional with 3-State Output pins 65-68, 71-74, 27-
24, 21-28. Bi-directional 16-bit System Data Bus used to transfer data 
between the CS8900A and the host. 
SA [0:19]: System Address Bus, Input pins 37-48, 50-54, 58-60. Lower 20 bits of the 
24-bit System Address Bus used to decode accesses to CS8900A I/O and 
Memory space, and attached Boot PROM. SA0-SA15 are used for I/O Read 
and Write operations. SA0-SA19 are used in conjunction with external 
decode logic for Memory Read and Write operations. 
SBHE_n: System Bus High Enable, Input pin 36. Active-low input indicates a data 
transfer on the high byte of the System Data Bus (SD8-SD15). After a 
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 hardware or a software reset, provide a HIGH to LOW and then LOW to 
HIGH transition on SBHE signal before any I/O or memory access is done 
to the CS8900A. 
IOR_n: I/O Read, Input pin 61. When IOR_n is low and a valid address is detected, the 
CS8900A outputs the contents of the selected 16-bit I/O register onto the 
System Data Bus. IOR_n is ignored if REFRESH_n is low. 
IOW_n: I/O Write, Input pin 62. When IOW_n is low and a valid address is detected, 
the CS8900A writes the data on the system Data Bus into the selected 16-bit 
I/O register. IOW_n is ignored if REFRESH_n is low. 
INTRQ [0:3]: Interrupt Request, 3-State pins 30-32, 35. Active-high output indicates 
the presence of an interrupt event. Interrupt Request goes low once the 
Interrupt Status Queue (ISQ) is read as all 0’s. Only one Interrupt 
Request output is used (one is selected during configuration). All non-
selected Interrupt Request outputs are placed in a high-impedance state. 
RESET: Reset, Input pin 75. Active-high asynchronous input used to reset the 
CS8900A. Must be stable for at least 400 ns before the CS8900A recognizes 
the signal as a valid reset. 
MEMW_n: Memory_Read, Input pin 29. Active-low input indicates that the host is 
excecuting a Memory Read operation. 
MEMR_n: Memory Write, Input pin 28. Active-low input indicates that the host is 
excecuting a Memory Write operation. 
CHIPSEL_n: Chip Select, Input pin 7. Active-low input generated by external 
Latchable Address bus decode logic when a valid memory address is 
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 present on the ISA bus. If Memory Mode operation is not needed, 
CHIPSEL_n should be tied low. The CHIPSEL_n is ignored for I/O 
and DMA mode of the CS8900A. 
In the Silicon Firewall system, the pins used are presented in table 5.12. 
Table 5.12 The Pins of CS8900A Used in The Silicon Firewall System 
CS8900A Pin Name Silicon Firewall Pin Name 
SD [0:15] NEDK_data [15..0] 
SA [0:19] NEDK_reg_address [2..0] 
IOR_n NEDK_L_IOR_n 
IOW_n NEDK_L_IOW_n 
SBHE_n /NEDK_SBHE_n 
INTRQ [0:3] NEDK_L_IRQ 
RESET NEDK_RESET 
 
In I/O mode all the register numbers are even numbers. That is to say the least 
significant bits are all “0”. Thus in the Silicon Firewall design the least significant bit is 
connected to ground, and only three bits are needed. The Silicon Firewall system uses 
“INTRQ0” as the interrupt pin. 
5.6.2 System Operation  
After compiling the Silicon Firewall design successfully, one programming file is 
generated by the Quartus II compiler, which can be used to program or configure the 
APEX device. The configuration data is downloaded into a flash memory device on the 
Nios development board over a serial port. Then the APEX device is configured using 
the data stored in flash memory. 
First start the “bash” shell, which is an UNIX command shell that allows running the 
“nios-build” and “nios-run” utility on the Nios development board provided with the 
GNUPro Nios software development tools. The “inc” and “lib” directories are 
subdirectories in the “SDK” folder, which contain a memory map and peripheral 
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 structures based on the memory layout and particular peripherals of the Silicon Firewall 
system. Since the plugs library is changed, so it has to be rebuilt using the “make –s 
all” command in the “lib” directory. A typical session of library rebuild is shown 
below.  
[nios]$ make -s all 
2003.10.19.00:03:38 --- Deleting libnios32.a libnios32_debug.a 
2003.10.19.00:03:38 --- Removing objects 
2003.10.19.00:03:41 --- Compiling cs8900.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:43 --- Compiling flash_AMD29LV800.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:44 --- Assembling nios_atexit.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:44 --- Assembling nios_copyrange.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:45 --- Assembling nios_cstubs.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:45 --- Assembling nios_cwpmanager.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:45 --- Compiling nios_debug.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:46 --- Assembling nios_delay.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:46 --- Assembling nios_emulator.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:46 --- Compiling nios_gdb_stub.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:47 --- Compiling nios_gdb_stub_io.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:48 --- Assembling nios_gdb_stub_isr.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:48 --- Assembling nios_getctlreg.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:48 --- Compiling nios_gprof.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:49 --- Assembling nios_isrmanager.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:49 --- Assembling nios_jumptoreset.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:49 --- Assembling nios_jumptostart.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:50 --- Assembling nios_math1.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:50 --- Compiling nios_printf.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:50 --- Assembling nios_setjmp.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:50 --- Assembling nios_setup.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:51 --- Compiling nios_sprintf.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:51 --- Assembling nios_zerorange.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:52 --- Compiling pio_lcd16207.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:56 --- Assembling pio_showhex.s 
2003.10.19.00:03:56 --- Compiling plugs.c 
2003.10.19.00:03:59 --- Compiling plugs_print.c 
2003.10.19.00:04:00 --- Assembling timer_milliseconds.s 
2003.10.19.00:04:01 --- Assembling uart_rxchar.s 
2003.10.19.00:04:01 --- Assembling uart_txchar.s 
2003.10.19.00:04:01 --- Assembling uart_txcr.s 
2003.10.19.00:04:01 --- Assembling uart_txhex.s 
2003.10.19.00:04:01 --- Assembling uart_txhex16.s 
2003.10.19.00:04:01 --- Assembling uart_txhex32.s 
2003.10.19.00:04:02 --- Assembling uart_txstring.s 
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 2003.10.19.00:04:02 --- Building libnios32.a 
2003.10.19.00:04:02 --- Compiling cs8900.c 
 
Then in the “src” directory, the “nios-build” utility compiles the C code in the “sfw.c” 
file. Finally an executable file “sfw.srec” is generated. A typical session of “nios-build 
sfw.c” is shown below.  
[nios]$ nios-build sfw.c 
 
-------------------- 
Beginning Build 
-------------------- 
 
Sources: 
     sfw_menu.c 
     sfw.c 
 
# 2003.10.24 21:24:52 (*) nios-elf-gcc  -I ../inc -I ../../inc -I ../../../inc - 
I ../../../../inc -I ../../../../../inc -g -O2 -m32 sfw_menu.c -o sfw_menu.c.o - 
c 
 
# 2003.10.24 21:24:52 (*) nios-elf-gcc  -I ../inc -I ../../inc -I ../../../inc - 
I ../../../../inc -I ../../../../../inc -g -O2 -m32 sfw.c -o sfw.c.o -c 
 
# 2003.10.24 21:24:53 (*) nios-elf-ld -e _start -u _start -g -T /cygdrive/c/alte 
ra/excalibur/sopc_builder_2_5/bin/nios.ld  ../lib/obj32/nios_jumptostart.s.o sfw 
_menu.c.o sfw.c.o --start-group -l nios32 -l c -l m -l gcc -l c -l nios32 --end- 
group -L/cygdrive/c/altera/excalibur/sopc_builder_2_5/bin/nios-gnupro/nios-elf/l 
ib/m32 -L/cygdrive/c/altera/excalibur/sopc_builder_2_5/bin/nios-gnupro/lib/gcc-l 
ib/nios-elf/2.9-nios-010801-20020103/m32 -L../lib -L../../lib -L../../../lib -L. 
./../../../lib -L../../../../../lib -L../inc -L../../inc -L../../../inc -L../../ 
../../inc -L../../../../../inc -L. -o sfw.out 
 
# 2003.10.24 21:24:54 (*) nios-elf-objcopy -O srec sfw.out sfw.srec 
 
# 2003.10.24 21:24:54 (*) nios-elf-nm sfw.out | sort > sfw.nm 
# 2003.10.24 21:24:54 (*) nios-elf-objdump -D --source sfw.out > sfw.objdump 
 
-------------------- 
Finishing Build 
-------------------- 
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 The “nios-run” utility download the “sfw.srec” program over the serial port and runs it 
in the Nios_based Silicon Firewall system module. For a second download, the “clear” 
button (SW2) has to be pressed first. In the Silicon Firewall design, the “sfw.srec” 
program is used to initialize the whole system and control the hardware-software mode 
switching. When downloading the “sfw.srec” program is complete, the Silicon Firewall 
system is ready to receive the packet data. By default the system is in software mode; it 
can be switched to hardware mode by press the “q” button of the keyboard. The 
program keeps running to receive packet data unless “ctrl+c” is pressed to stop it. 
Figure 5.6 shows the complete system; the Nios development board and the computer 
that the software (NDK, NEDK) is installed on. The big window on the screen is 
Quartus II window; the small black window is the “bash” shell window. Figure 5.7 
shows the picture of the Nios Development Board with the daughter card attached. 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the sequence of events of packet reception. 
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Figure 5.6 Silicon Firewall Design System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Nios Development Board With The Attached Daughter Card 
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No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Interrupt? 
Read the ISQ 
Read RxLength 
Read Part of the Frame 
Data
Generate the SA
CAM Match?
Read the packet data 
Stop?
Ctrl+c 
Figure 5.8 Sequence of Events of Packet Reception 
5.6.3 Pin and Register Manipulation In The Software Configurations 
In the following only those bits in registers that are used are shown and discussed. The 
interested reader is referred to [18]. 
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 The “sfw.c” implements the low-level routines for an adapter that the "plugs" 
embedded TCP/IP stack can use. This file resets the chip to a usable state. This 
involves some pin manipulation, and then some register manipulation. 
First, the reset pin is raised and lowered, and then the "byte high enable (bhe)" is forced 
to undergo multiple-transitions. Multiple logic-transitions on the SBHE_n (byte-enable) 
pin are used to set the CS8900A in the appropriate communications-mode. This is the 
first thing that needs to be done. This sequence (a group of byte-writes) results in 
multiple edge-transitions on the CS8900's byte-enable input. After this, some internal 
registers are written. 
1. RxCTL: Receiver Control (Read/Write) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
        
F E D C B A 9 8 
    BroadcastA IndividualA  RxOKA 
 
The value is “0000_1101_0000_0000”. The three bits are set are as follows: 
• RxOKA 
When set, the CS8900A accepts frames with correct CRC and valid length 
(valid length is: 64 bytes<=length<= 1518 bytes). 
• BroadcastA 
When set, receive frames are accepted if the Destination Address is FFFF FFFF 
FFFFh. 
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 • IndividualA 
When set, receive frames are accepted if the Destination Address matches the 
Individual address found at PacketPage base + 0158h to PacketPage base + 
015Dh. 
In the reference design, promiscuous mode is used. In the Silicon Firewall design, 
broadcast and individual address are used, because only the packet going to the Nios 
CPU will be examined, there is no concern about any other packets in the network. 
2. RxCFG: Receiver Configuration (Read/Write) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
        
F E D C B A 9 8 
 ExtradataiE RuntiE CRCerroriE    RxOKiE 
 
The Value is” 0111_0001_0000_0000”. The four bits are set are as follows: 
• ExtradataiE 
When set, there is an Extradata Interrupt if a frame is longer than1518 bytes.  
The operation of this bit is independent of the received packet integrity (good or 
bad CRC). 
• RuntiE 
When set, there is a Runt Interrupt if a frame is received that is shorter than 64 
bytes. The CS8900A always discards any frame that is shorter than 8 bytes. 
• CRCerror iE 
 When set, there is a CRC error Interupt if a frame is received with a bad CRC. 
• RxOKiE 
When set, there is an RxOK Interrupt if a frame is received without errors. 
RxOK interrupt is not generated when DMA mode is used for frame reception. 
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 3. LineCTL (Read/Write) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
SerTxON SerRxON       
F E D C B A 9 8 
        
 
The value is “0000_0000_1100_0000”. The two bits are set are as follows: 
• SerRxON  
When set, the receiver is enabled. When clear, no incoming packets pass 
through the receiver. 
• SerTxON  
 When set, the transmitter is enabled. When clear, no transmissions are allowed. 
4. BusCTL (Read/Write) 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
        
F E D C B A 9 8 
EnableIRQ        
 
The value is “1000_0000_0000_0000”. The bit to be set is: 
• EnableIRQ 
When set, the CS8900A will generate an interrupt in response to an interrupt 
event. When clear, the CS8900A will not generate any interrupt. 
5.6.4 CS8900A Interrupt 
The interrupt request signal is a very important signal for use in the Silicon Firewall. It 
will be discussed in this section. 
5.6.4.1 Interrupt Activation 
The CS8900A has four interrupt request output pins that can be connected directly to 
any four of the ISA bus Interrupt Request signals. Only one interrupt output is used at a 
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 time. It is selected by writing the interrupt number (0 to 3) into PacketPage 
Memorybase + 0022h. Unused interrupt request pins are placed in a high-impedance 
state. The selected interrupt request pin goes high when an enabled interrupt is 
triggered. The pin goes low after the first read of the Interrupt Status Queue (ISQ). In 
this research project design, INTRQ0 is used, so “0” is written into PacketPage 
Memorybase + 0022h to activate it.  
5.6.4.2 Interrupt Re-enable 
Enabling the interrupt is not enough, the interrupt only goes high once after that. In 
order to make the Silicon Firewall handle all the interrupts, the interrupt pin must be re-
enabled after each event. This is done when the Interrupt Status Queue (ISQ) is read as 
all 0’s. 
The Interrupt Status Queue (ISQ) is used by the CS8900A to communicate Event 
reports to the host processor. Whenever an event occurs that triggers an enabled 
interrupt, the CS8900A sets the appropriate bit(s) in one of the five registers, maps the 
contents of that register to the ISQ, and drives the selected interrupt request pin high. 
When the host services the interrupt, it must first read the ISQ to learn the nature of the 
interrupt. It can then process the interrupt. 
Three of the registers mapped into the ISQ are event registers: RxEvent, TxEvent, and 
BufEvent. The other two registers are counter-overflow reports: RxMISS and TxCOL. 
There may be more than one RxEvent report and/or more than one TxEvent report in 
the ISQ at a time. However, there may be only one BufEvent report, one RxMISS 
report and one TxCOL report in the ISQ at any one time. 
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 Event reports stored in the ISQ are read out in the order of priority, with RxEvent first, 
followed by TxEvent, BufEvent, RxMiss, and the TxCOL. The host needs to read from 
the ISQ to get the interrupt currently at the front of the queue. In I/O mode, the ISQ is 
located at I/O base + 0008h. Each time the host reads the ISQ, the bits in the 
corresponding register are cleared and the next report in the queue moves to the front. 
When the host starts reading the ISQ, it must read and process all the event reports in 
the queue. A read out of a null word (0000h) indicates that all the interrupts have been 
read. After this null readout the interrupt is re-enabled. 
In this research project, RxEvent is the only event. There are different ways to reading 
out of a null word, for example, (a). read ISQ, read RxEvent, read ISQ; (b). read ISQ, 
read RxLength, read the packet based on the RxLength, read ISQ; (c) read ISQ, read 
RxLength or RxStatus, Set SKIP_1 bit in RxCFG, read ISQ. 
The condition in case (a) is called an “implied skip”, which is not recommended by 
Cirrus Logic. In the Silicon Firewall design, the hardware only extracts the IP address 
and the task of reading the whole packet is done by the Nios CPU. Therefore case (b) is 
not proper for this design. Case (c) is adopted in the hardware design. Note that the “Set 
SKIP_1 bit” will cause the last committed received frame to be deleted from the receive 
buffer, since the Nios CPU has not read the whole packet, the hardware ignores this 
part. As well, until the Nios CPU reads the whole packet, the RxEvent can not be 
cleared by reading the ISQ. Therefore the last “Read ISQ” is ignored by the hardware 
part since the Nios CPU will perform this function. 
5.6.5 CS8900A and Silicon Firewall Hardware 
The reader is referred to appendix A and appendix C. 
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 When there is an interrupt, the hardware first reads the ISQ register, then it reads the 
RxLength Register, and then it reads the packet data 16 times continuously. The 
CS8900A’s internal architecture is based on a 16-bit data bus. Since the packet format 
is fixed and the source IP address is in words 15 and 16, a counter is used to count the 
16-bit data words, and the 15th and 16th 16-bit data will be combined together to form 
the 32-bit IP Source Address (SA). 
Reading the RxLength register means accessing the internal register. To access any of 
the CS8900A’s internal registers in I/O mode, the host must first setup the PacketPage 
Pointer [23]. It does this by writing the PacketPage address of the target register to the 
PacketPage Pointer Port (I/O base + 000A). The contents of the target register is then 
mapped into the PacketPage Data Port (I/O base + 000Ch). This has to be done 
according to the switching characteristics of the CS8900A. Table 5.13 and Figure 5.9 
show the 16-bit I/O read and write switching characteristics. The system clock is 
33.3333 MHz, so another counter is used to count the clock cycles, so that individual 
timing requirements can be met. 
Table 5.13 Switching Characteristics of CS8900A (from [18]) 
(a). 16-Bit I/O Read 
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 (b). 16-Bit I/O Write 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 16-Bit I/O Read 
 
(b) 16-Bit I/O Write 
Figure 5.9 Switching Characteristics of CS8900A (from [18]) 
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 5.7 Nios System Components 
Table 5.14 lists the system components. 
Table 5.14 System Components of Silicon Firewall System 
Module Name Description Bus Type Base Width of 
PIO 
IRQ 
Ref_system_cpu Altera Nios 2.0 CPU Avalon 0x000   
Boot_monitor_rom On-Chip memory 
(RAM or ROM) 
Avalon 0x400   
UART_1 UART (RS-232 
serial port) 
Avalon 0x420  26 
Seven_seg_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x440 16  
Timer1 Interval timer Avalon 0x460  25 
Led1_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x470 1  
Button_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x480 12 27 
Lcd_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x40000 11  
Ext_ram SRAM (one or two 
IDT71V016 chips) 
Avalon_tristate 0x100000   
Ext_flash Flash memory Avalon_tristate 0x500   
enet Ethernet Interface 
(CS8900) 
Avalon_tristate 0x520  30 
Pattern_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x530 32  
Cam_control_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x540 6  
Mfound_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x550 1  
Maddress_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x560 5  
Sel_control_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon  1  
Ext_ram_bus Avalon Tri-state bus Avalon_tristate|avalon    
Nedk_card_bus Avalon Tri-state bus Avalon_tristate|avalon    
Clocken_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x430 2  
Mode_pio PIO (Parallel I/O) Avalon 0x570 1  
 
In this table, Mfound_pio is used to interrupt the Nios CPU when there is a match. 
Sel_control_pio is used to control the mode of the Silicon Firewall in hardware. The 
Nios CPU also read the Sel_control_pio back when there is an interrupt. In this case it 
is called Mode_pio. 
5.8 Software-Hardware Switching Mechanism 
During the Silicon Firewall operation, both the Nios CPU and the “sfw” module need 
to communicate with the CS8900A. Both the Nios CPU and the “sfw” read packet data 
from CS8900A. Since only one signal can be connected to an output or bidirectional 
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 pin, three 2-input bus multiplexers are used to connect the three pins 
(NEDK_reg_address[2..0], NEDK_L_IOR_n, NEDK_L_IOW_n) to the Nios CPU and 
the CS8900A. This is also true for the pattern input signal of CAM. The two inputs of 
the bus multiplexer are from Nios CPU and “sfw” respectively. 
Since the NEDK_data [15..0] pins are bi-directional pins, two tri-state bus 
megafunction were used for the connection. One is used for the Nios CPU, the other is 
used for the “sfw” module. There are four control signals: sw_r_enable, sw_w_enable; 
hw_r_enable, hw_w_enable. Four more 2-input bus multiplexers are used to generate 
these four control signals. For the two multiplexers output sw_r_enable and 
sw_w_enable, one of the inputs is from Nios, the other input is connected to “Vcc”; For 
the two multiplexers output hw_r_enable and hw_w_enable, one of the inputs is from 
“sfw”, the other input is connected to “Vcc”. In total eight 2-input bus-multiplexers are 
used in the Software-Hardware switching mechanism. All of them use the same control 
signal, which comes from Nios CPU through the “sel_control_pio” peripheral. In the 
Silicon Firewall design, “1” means hardware mode; “0” means software mode. 
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 Chapter 6 TESTING AND RESULTS 
The SignalTap logic analyzer and Ethereal network analyzer are used to analyze the 
results of this project. The Ping command is used to test the Silicon Firewall system. 
All of them will be introduced before the further discussion of the testing and results. 
6.1 SignalTap Overview 
The SignalTap® logic analyzer [23] is a megafunction that captures signals from any 
internal node or I/O pin of an APEX II or APEX 20K device in real-time at system 
speed. Also, the SignalTap analysis eliminates the need for external probes and design 
file changes to capture signals from an internal node and works with all existing EDA 
synthesis tool design flows. Both the logic analyzer controls and signal capture display 
are accessible from the Quartus II design software. Data transfer between the APEX II 
or APEX 20K device and the Quartus II software for waveform display of signals 
captured by SignalTap logic analysis is supported by the MasterBlaster™ or 
ByteBlasterMV™ communications cables. Figure 6.1 shows the SignalTap logic 
analyzer.
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Figure 6.1 SignalTap Logic Analyzer (from [23]) 
6.1.1 Functional Description 
Generally, the SignalTap megafunction is an embedded logic analyzer that provides 
access to signals inside an APEX II or APEX 20K device. The embedded logic analyzer 
function can be parameterized to capture up to 128 signals from internal nodes or I/O 
pins in-system and at system speed. From within the Quartus II software, the following 
items can be selected: which signals will be captured, when signal capture starts, and 
how many samples of data are captured. Also, the captured data can be stored in APEX 
II or APEX 20K embedded system block (ESB) RAM, or be sent to I/O pins for capture 
by external analysis equipment. Two things will be done to the data stored in ESB 
RAM, first it is transferred to a host computer by using the MasterBlaster or 
ByteBlasterMV communication cable. then it can be displayed in the SignalTap 
waveform viewer. The SignalTap logic analyzer can be automatically instantiated by 
the Quartus II software without making changes to user design files. 
1. Assigning a Signal to the SignalTap File 
As mentioned previously, signals can be captured from any internal device node 
or I/O pins by the SignalTap analyzer. However, before signals capturing, the 
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 internal nodes or I/O pins must be assigned to SignalTap analyzer input channel. 
The SignalTap analyzer can capture from 1 to 128 internal nodes or I/O signals. 
nalyzer uses more LEs as more signals are captured. 
2. 
. The signals that are 
 Control option. 
3. 
sing a global clock signal as the acquisition 
4. 
 are used as 
e sample buffer depth is increased. 
5. 
 
 setting the ratio of pre-trigger to post-
trigger data saved in the sample buffer. 
The SignalTap a
Filter Control 
The Filter Control dialog box allows selecting signals from a specific instance in 
the design to be displayed in the SignalTap window
displayed can be managed by the Filter
Selecting an Acquisition Clock Signal 
All input channels are sampled on the rising edge of the acquisition clock signal, 
which must be a device signal. U
signal is recommended by Altera. 
Setting the Sample Buffer Depth 
 The sample buffer depth controls the amount of data the SignalTap analyzer 
captures when using the internal RAM configuration. More ESBs
more signals are captured and th
Setting the Triggering Position 
A Trigger Position setting allows specifying the amount of data captured by the 
SignalTap logic analyzer that should be acquired before the trigger and the 
amount that should be acquired after the trigger. Figure 6.2 shows the circular 
buffer where the acquired data is placed in. The SignalTap logic analyzer 
continues sampling the input signals to capture post-trigger data when triggered. 
The settings shown in Table 6.1 allows
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              Figure 6.2 Circular Signal Capture Buffer (from [23]) 
 
Table 6.1 Trigger Position (from [24])  
Name Description 
Pre-trigger Captures signals immediately after triggering 
(12% pre-trigger, 88% post-trigger) 
Center Captures signals before and after triggering 
(50% pre-trigger, 50% post-trigger) 
Post-trigger Captures signals that occur immediately before 
triggering (88% pre-trigger, 12% post-trigger) 
Continuous 
trigger 
Captures signals indefinitely until stopped 
manually  
 
2. Setting the Trigger Pattern 
Signal pattern recognition is used for triggering by the SignalTap analyzer. 
Within the Quartus II software, the logic condition for each input signal to 
specify the trigger pattern is set. The SignalTap analyzer is triggered if the input 
signal matches the trigger pattern. Table 6.2 lists possible trigger patterns for 
each channel. 
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 Table 6.2 Channel Trigger Patterns (from [23]) 
Trigger Pattern  Description 
 
Don’t Care Default trigger condition. The channel is not used to 
determine the trigger event. 
Low  The analyzer triggers when the channel is low. 
High  The analyzer triggers when the channel is high. 
 
 
Falling 
 
The analyzer triggers when the channel is falling. 
 
Rising The analyzer triggers when the channel is rising. 
 
Rising or Falling 
Edge 
The analyzer triggers when the channel is rising or falling. 
 
 
6.2 The Ethereal Network Analyzer 
Ethereal [25] is a network protocol analyzer for use on Unix and Windows operating 
systems. It allows examining data from a live network or from a capture file on disk. 
With Ethereal, the capture data can be browsed interactively by viewing summary and 
detail information for each packet. Also, Ethereal has several features, including the 
ability to view the reconstructed stream of a TCP session.  
6.3 Ping Command 
“Ping” is one of the most useful network debugging tools. It takes its name from a 
submarine sonar search - if a short sound burst is sent and an echo is listened- a ping - 
coming back.  
In an IP network, “ping” sends a short data burst (a single packet) and listens for a 
single packet in reply. The most basic function of an IP network (delivery of single 
packet) can be tested by a “ping”, which is implemented using the required ICMP Echo 
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 function. The first two packets are broadcast packets, which are important for the 
following four ICMP packets going through. 
6.4 Testing Methodology 
In order to test the Silicon Firewall system easily, a small network that consists of three 
computers are made up: Mordor, Nios1 and Athlon2. The “Ethereal” was installed in 
the Mordor computer, and the “ping” command is issued from there. Nios1 is the name 
for the soft core Nios CPU in the Silicon Firewall system. The NDK and the NEDK are 
installed in Athlon2, also the testing result is displayed in the Quartus II software in this 
computer. 
Basically, the results will be discussed in two sections, in section 6.4.1, the Silicon 
Firewall results will be demonstrated; the results of software firewall will be 
demonstrated in section 6.4.2, and some comparison will be given. 
Before any detailed result is given, some configurations of SignalTap will be discussed. 
In this project, the “clock” for the SignalTap is the clock from the APEX board, which 
is “33.33333 MHz”. For the Silicon Firewall, the sample depth is “1K”samples due to 
the limitation of the ESBs included in the APEX EP20K200E device and the number of 
nodes. For the software firewall, the sample depth is “16K” because of fewer signals 
being traced. The “Pre” trigger position is used. In CAM initialization, the trigger 
pattern is the rising edge of the “wren” signal. For both the Silicon Firewall and 
software firewall, the rising edge of interrupt signal from “NEDK_L_IRQ” is used as 
the trigger pattern. 
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 6.4.1 Silicon Firewall Results 
In this section, the results will be discussed in the following sequence. In section 
6.4.1.1, the IP address of Mordor is stored in CAM when CAM is initialized, after that, 
a “ping” command is issued from Mordor. In section 6.4.1.2, the CAM is initialized 
without the IP address of Morder. 
6.4.1.1 Results for an Authorized Packet 
Figure 6.3 shows the waveform of CAM initialization, the IP address (192.168.128.216) 
of Mordor is written into CAM as a pattern, the value of which is “a8c02381” in 
hexadecimal. 
Figure 6.4 demonstrates the result when the “ping” command is issued from Mordor. 
First of all, an interrupt is generated from the CS8900A, the “NEDK_L_IRQ” goes 
high, and the first read of “ISQ” make this signal goes low. After that, the interrupt is 
re-enabled by reading the “RxLength” and part of the packet data. Then the IP address 
of Morder is reconstructed and fed into CAM. Since there is such a pattern stored in 
CAM, “mfound” goes high corresponding to a match. Before this point, the system is 
running in “Hw” mode. The “mfound” signal interrupts the Nios CPU to switch to “Sw” 
mode, and the Nios reads the complete packet data. From figure 6.4, the time between 
the interrupt that comes from the CS8900A IRQ line going high and “mfound” going 
high is 284 clock cycles. 
Figure 6.5 shows the packet data captured by Ethereal. When the “ping” command is 
issued, four packets are sent out one after another. Figure 6.4 demonstrates what 
happens to one of them due to the buffer space limitation.
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Figure 6.3 CAM Initialization-1
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Figure 6.4 Results For an Authorized Packet In Hardware Mode
 103
  
Figure 6.5 Data Captured By Ethereal For Authorized Packets
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 6.4.1.2 Results for Un-authorized Packet 
Figure 6.6 shows the CAM initialization without the pattern for Mordor’s IP address. In 
this case, when the “ping” command is issued from Mordor, the interrupt still goes high, 
however, “mfound” never goes high since there is not a match any more (figure 6.7 
demonstrates this), and the complete packet data will not be read by the Nios CPU. The 
“ping” command get timed out since there is no reply (figure 6.8 shows the data 
captured by Ethereal). 
6.4.2 Software vs. Hardware Implementations  
For the purpose of comparison, a software firewall is created using the same structure as 
the Silicon Firewall. For the software firewall, the CAM is initialized with the pattern of 
Athlon2’s IP address. Since the software firewall does table lookup sequentially, there 
are best case and worst case. For the best case, there is a match at the first address of the 
lookup table, the time interval is 9359 clock cycles (see figure 6.9); for the worst case, 
there is a match at the end of the lookup table, the time interval is 9598 clock cycles 
(see figure 6.10). Therefore, the Silicon Firewall is much faster than the software 
firewall (284 clock cycles vs. 9359 clock cycles). 
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Figure 6.6 CAM Initialization-2
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Figure 6.7 Results For an Un-authorized Packet
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Figure 6.8 Data Captured By Ethereal For Un-authorized Packets
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 Figure 6.9 Results of Software Firewall For an Authorized Packet (Best Case)
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Figure 6.10 Results of Software Firewall For an Authorized Packet (Worst Case) 
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 Chapter 7 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis addresses issues related to a Silicon Firewall design and implementation in 
an Altera FPGA. The performance of this hardware firewall is tested using a real 
network, and compared with a software firewall design with silmilar architecture. This 
chapter summarizes the work that was done and presents future areas of research. 
7.1 Summary 
The Internet security problem was presented, and different security models were 
discussed. The firewall was identified as an effective type of network security. The 
possible inefficiency of the traditional software firewall technology was introduced, and 
the hardware firewall feasibility was reviewed. The research objective, an investigation 
of if and how existing software firewall technology could be improved by replacing 
software functionality with hardware (silicon) was then presented. 
The Internet security system was reviewed. Different security strategies were discussed, 
and the TCP/IP fundamentals were introduced as background. Packet filtering was also 
presented.  
Since the Silicon Firewall system is an embedded real-time system, and the design is a 
hardware-software codesign, some background on embedded system and hardware-
software codesign was discussed. The Silicon Firewall system design was then 
presented in detail. SOPC design and embedded processor PLD solutions were 
introduced as the background needed to understand the Silicon Firewall system design. 
The Altera Excalibur embedded PLD solutions were presented, and based on a 
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 discussion of soft core and hard core implementations, the rationale for using the Nios 
soft core embedded processor in this research project was justified. 
The details of the Nios embedded processor and two development kits (NDK and 
NEDK) were introduced. The Nios development board and the Ethernet daughter card 
as well as the two libraries (Nios peripheral library and Ethernet plugs library) were 
introduced.  
The two most important components of the Silicon Firewall, the CS8900A Ethernet 
controller and the CAM implementation were reviewed. The Silicon Firewall design 
was described in detail, following the discussion of the CS8900A and CAM. 
The SignalTap embedded logic analyer and the Ethernet network analyzer were 
introduced as the two tools used to capture data in the Silicon Firewall system testing. 
Background of the “Ping” command was also given. The testing methodology used was 
introduced and the Silicon Firewall system test results were presented. 
7.2  Conclusions 
The objective of this research was to “investigate if and how existing desktop computer 
software firewall technology could be improved by replacing software functionality 
with hardware (silicon).” The results show that this research objective has been 
successfully achieved: 
1. Test results confirm that the Silicon Firewall system functions as an Internet 
firewall. 
2. Comparison of the hardware firewall and software firewall show that the Silicon 
Firewall system is much faster than the traditional software firewall (284 clock 
sysles vs. 9359 clock cycles). 
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 It should be noted that since the research was started 3Com Corporation has announced 
[26] development of an embedded firewall with similar capabilities to the Silicon 
Firewall. It was not yet appeared as a consumer product at this time. 
7.3 Future Work 
While the project has been successful in reaching the goal of design of a Silicon 
Firewall, further improvements must be done for a viable system in the future: 
• Other CAMs 
Since the Silicon Firewall system in this research project does packet filtering 
only by the source IP address, only one CAM was included. However, the final 
Silicon Firewall may do other kinds of packet filtering, for example, by service, 
source port and so forth. Other CAMs may need to be added to the Silicon 
Firewall system. This may necessitate the need for external CAM. 
• Dynamic CAM 
This is another issue related to CAM in the future. The CAM is pre-loaded with 
a number of patterns in advance for now, but dynamically changing the patterns 
in the CAM is desirable. 
• Logging of IP addresses 
For the current Silicon Firewall system, an unauthorized packet will disappear 
after being blocked. In the future, logging of source IP address can be done for 
the purpose of determining who is attempting the attack. 
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 • Remote Administration 
Currently, the Silicon Firewall only can be administrated in the local computer. 
A remote administration feature may be desirable in the future. This will allow 
system administrators to update individual user machines from a central site. 
• PC Integration 
The final purpose is integrating the Silicon Firewall system with a PC. This 
would include PC bus implementation and appropriate drivers for the Silicon 
Firewall system.
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 APPENDIX A BLOCK DIAGRAM OF SILICON FIREWALL 
DESIGN 
(See CD) 
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 APPENDIX B CAM INITIALIZATION 
 
void cam_initialize(void) 
 
//define three CAM initialization-related pios 
np_pio *pattern_in=na_pattern_pio; 
np_pio *cam_control=na_cam_control_pio; 
np_pio *clocken=na_clocken_pio; 
 
//define “input” or “output” of each pio 
clocken->np_piodirection=1;            //set "clocken" as output 
pattern_in->np_piodirection=1;        //set "pattern_in" as output 
cam_control->np_piodirection=1;    //set "cam_control" as output 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x00;     //initialize the cam_control pio data to be "0" 
clocken->np_piodata=2;                  //enable inclocken and disable outclocken 
 
//Initialize CAM with 32 patterns, two of them are IP address of Mordor and Athlon2, 
//the rest patterns can be any 32-bit numbers, in this file, all of them are “0x10101010”. 
//For each pattern, set up wren and wraddress first, and then pattern. The 32 addresses 
//can be written in any sequence.  
 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x23;    //set "wen=1","waddress=3" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf;          //set “wen=0” after each write 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x2b;            //set "wen=1","waddress=b" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0xa8c02381;    //ip address of Mordor 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x2f;           //set "wen=1","waddress=f" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010;    
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x20;          //set "wen=1","waddress=0" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x21;          //set "wen=1","waddress=1" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010;
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 cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x22;         //set "wen=1","waddress=2" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x24;        //set "wen=1","waddress=4" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x25;       //set "wen=1","waddress=5" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x26;       //set "wen=1","waddress=6" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x27;       //set "wen=1","waddress=7" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x28;      //set "wen=1","waddress=8" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x29;     //set "wen=1","waddress=9" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x2a;    //set "wen=1","waddress=a" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x2c;    //set "wen=1","waddress=c" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x2d;   //set "wen=1","waddress=d" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x2e;   //set "wen=1","waddress=e" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x30;        //set "wen=1","waddress=16" 
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 pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x31;      //set "wen=1","waddress=17" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x32;      //set "wen=1","waddress=18" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x33;      //set "wen=1","waddress=19" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x34;      //set "wen=1","waddress=20" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x35;     //set "wen=1","waddress=21" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x36;    //set "wen=1","waddress=22" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x37;    //set "wen=1","waddress=23" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x38;   //set "wen=1","waddress=24" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x39;   //set "wen=1","waddress=25" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x3a;  //set "wen=1","waddress=26" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x3b;  //set "wen=1","waddress=27" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
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 cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x3c;   //set "wen=1","waddress=28" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x3d;   //set "wen=1","waddress=29" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
  
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x3e;   //set "wen=1","waddress=30" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0xa8c0d981;   // ip address of Athlon2 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
cam_control->np_piodata=0x3f;   //set "wen=1","waddress=31" 
pattern_in->np_piodata=0x10101010; 
 
cam_control->np_piodata&=0xdf; 
clocken->np_piodata=3;   //enable both input and output clock 
 
}
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 APPENDIX C IP SOURCE ADDRESS RECONSTRUCTION 
MODULE 
//This Verilog module functions according to the interrupt from the CS8900A, for each 
//interrupt, the ISQ register is read first to make the interrupt go low, then the Rx_length 
//and part of the frame date are read to re-enable the interrupt. The first 14 words of 
//frame data are skipped, the 15th word and the 16th word are two parts of the source IP 
//address, they are reconstructed and form the 32 bits IP address. 
 
module sfw( clk, irq_from_the_enet, nedk_card_bus_address, ior_n_to_the_enet, 
iow_n_to_the_enet, sfw_nedk_card_bus_data, data_out, sel); 
 
input clk, irq_from_the_enet, sel; 
output [2:0] nedk_card_bus_address; 
output ior_n_to_the_enet; 
output iow_n_to_the_enet; 
output [31:0] data_out; 
inout [15:0] sfw_nedk_card_bus_data; 
reg IRQ; 
reg ior_n_to_the_enet, iow_n_to_the_enet; 
reg [2:0] nedk_card_bus_address; 
reg [3:0]timing_cycle;  // “timing_cycle” is the system clock cycle, which is counted to 
// meet the switching characteristics of the CS8900A 
reg [5:0]command_cycle;  //every read of the register or the frame data is called a  
                                           //“command_cycle” 
reg [15:0] data_from_cs8900; 
reg [15:0] data_to_cs8900; 
reg [15:0] data1; 
reg [15:0] data2; 
reg [31:0] data_out; 
 
parameter Rx_Tx_0=3'b000; 
parameter Rx_Tx_1=3'b001; 
parameter TxCMD=3'b010; 
parameter Txlength=3'b011; 
parameter ISQ=3'b100; 
parameter PPP=3'b101; 
parameter PPD_0=3'b110;parameter PPD_1=3'b111; 
parameter Rx_status=16'b0000_0100_0000_0000; 
parameter Rx_length=16'b0000_0100_0000_0010; 
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 parameter Rx_config=16'b0000_0001_0000_0010; 
parameter Rx_event=16'b0000_0001_0010_0100; 
 
always @ (posedge clk) 
 
begin 
         if ((irq_from_the_enet==1) && (IRQ==0)) 
             begin 
                      command_cycle<=0; 
                      timing_cycle<=0; 
                      IRQ<=1; 
             end 
 
        else 
              begin  
                       case(command_cycle) 
                              6'b000000: 
                                   begin  //read ISQ 
                                             timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                             case(timing_cycle) 
                                                    4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=ISQ; 
                                                    4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                    4'b0111: begin  
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;                                             
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
                                                    4'b1111: begin       
command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;  
                                                                           timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                  end 
                                             endcase 
                                   end 
               
                              6'b000001: 
                                   begin  //read Rx_length 
                                             timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                             case(timing_cycle) 
                                                    4'b0001:nedk_card_bus_address<=PPP; //set up 
//packetpage pointer first 
                                                    4'b0010: iow_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                    4'b0011: data_to_cs8900<=Rx_length; 
                                                    4'b0111: begin  
                                                                           iow_n_to_the_enet<=1;                           
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011; 
                                                                           data_to_cs8900<=0;  
                                                                   end 
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                                                      4'b1001:nedk_card_bus_address<=PPD_0;  // read 
//data  from PPD_0                                                        
                                                     4'b1010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                     4'b1111: begin  
ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;                              
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011; 
                                                                            data_to_cs8900<=0;  
                                                                            command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;  
                                                                            timing_cycle<=0; 
                                                                    end 
                                             endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b000010:  //the frame data of the following 14 reads are skipped 
                                   begin //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                             timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                             case(timing_cycle) 
                                                    4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                    4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                    4'b0111: begin 
                                                                            ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;                     
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                   end 
                                     4'b1111: begin  
                                                             command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;  
                                                                             timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                   end 
                                             endcase 
                                   end 
                          
                              6'b000011: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                             timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                             case(timing_cycle) 
                                                    4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                    4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                    4'b0111: begin  
ior_n_to_the_enet<=1; 
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                   end 
                                                    4'b1111: begin 
command_cycle<=command_cycle+1; 
            timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                  end 
                                             endcase 
                                   end 
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                              6'b000100: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin 
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;                                       
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
                                                   4'b1111:begin                                                                          
command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;        
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                  end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b000101: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;     
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
                                                   4'b1111: begin  
                                                                             command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;            
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                   end 
                                             endcase 
                                   end 
 
               6'b000110: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;   
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
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                                                    4'b1111: begin   
                                                                           command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;   
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                  end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b000111: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;               
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
                                                   4'b1111: begin  
                                                                           command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;  
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                  end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end 
 
                6'b001000: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;           
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011; 
                                                                  end 
                                                   4'b1111: begin  
                                                                           command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;           
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                  end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b001001: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
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                                                    4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
                                                              ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;   
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
                                                   4'b1111: begin  
                                                                           command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;      
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                  end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b001010: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;       
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
                                                    4'b1111: begin  
                                                                           command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;    
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                   end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b001011: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin    
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;  
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                 end 
                                                   4'b1111: begin  
                                                                           command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;    
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                 end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end 
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                               6'b001100: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;  
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
                           4'b1111: begin  
   command_cycle<=command_cycle+1; 
timing_cycle<=0;  
   end 
                                             endcase 
  end 
 
                              6'b001101: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
ior_n_to_the_enet<=1; 
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end  
                                                   4'b1111: begin  
command_cycle<=command_cycle+1; 
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                  end 
                                             endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b001110: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
ior_n_to_the_enet<=1; 
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
                                                   4'b1111: begin  
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                                                                            command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;              
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                  end 
                                             endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b001111: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1; 
nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011;  
                                                                  end 
                                                   4'b1111: begin  
                                                                           command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;  
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                 end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b010000: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0, which is the first 16 bits of the  
//source IP address 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
                                            case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin 
                                                                          data1<=data_from_cs8900;  
                                                                          ior_n_to_the_enet<=1;                                         
                                                                          nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011; 
                                                                  end 
                                                   4'b1111: begin  
                                                                          command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;    
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                 end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end 
 
                              6'b010001: 
                                   begin  //read data from Rx_Tx_0, which is the second 16 bits of 
//the source IP address 
                                            timing_cycle<=timing_cycle+1; 
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                                             case(timing_cycle) 
                                                   4'b0001: nedk_card_bus_address<=Rx_Tx_0; 
                                                   4'b0010: ior_n_to_the_enet<=0; 
                                                   4'b0111: begin  
                                                                           data2<=data_from_cs8900; 
                                                                           ior_n_to_the_enet<=1; 
                                                                           nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b011; 
                                                                  end 
                                                   4'b1000: data_out<=(data1<<16)|data2; 
                                                   4'b1111:begin                                                                 
command_cycle<=command_cycle+1;  
timing_cycle<=0;  
                                                                 end 
                                            endcase 
                                   end               
               
                              default: 
                                          begin 
                                                   nedk_card_bus_address<=3'b000; 
                                                   ior_n_to_the_enet<=1; 
                                                   iow_n_to_the_enet<=1; 
                                                   IRQ<=0; 
data_out<=32'b0000_0000_0000_0000_0000_0000_00          
00_0000; 
                                          end    
                          
          endcase 
     end 
end 
                        
     
     bustri bustri_inst1 ( 
                      .data ( data_to_cs8900), 
                      .enabledt ( ~iow_n_to_the_enet ), 
                      .enabletr ( ~ior_n_to_the_enet ), 
                      .tridata ( sfw_nedk_card_bus_data ), 
                      .result ( data_from_cs8900 ) 
                      ); 
 
endmodule 
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 APPENDIX D  NDK COMPONENTS 
(See CD for Figure D.1 and Figure D.2) 
In this appendix, the three components of NDK: SOPC Builder system development 
tool, Quartus II development software and GNUPro Toolkit Compiler and Debugger 
will be discussed. 
D.1  SOPC Builder System Development Tool 
The SOPC Builder [27] system development tool simplifies the task of creating high-
performance system-on-a-programmable-chip (SOPC) designs by accelerating system 
definition and integration. Using SOPC Builder, a complete system can be defined and 
implemented, from hardware to software, within one tool and in a fraction of the time of 
traditional system-on-a-chip (SOC) design. SOPC Builder is integrated within the 
Altera Quartus II software to give Altera FPGA designers access to this development 
tool. 
SOPC Builder is a platform for composing bus-based systems from common system 
components placed inside or outside the FPGA. The SOPC Builder library components 
supplied by Altera or other third party developers range from simple blocks of fixed 
logic, to complex, parameterized, and dynamically generated subsystems. SOPC 
Builder library components include (according to [27]): 
• Processors 
• Microcontroller peripherals 
• Digital signal processing (DSP) cores 
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 • Intellectual property (IP) cores 
• Communications peripherals 
• Interfaces 
- Memory (on-chip or off-chip) 
- Buses and bridges 
- ASSPs 
- ASICs 
• Software components 
- Header files 
- Generic C drivers 
- Operating system (OS) kernels 
- Middleware libraries 
D.1.1  SOPC Builder Interface 
After a Quartus II project is opened, the SOPC Builder user interface can be launched 
by choosing SOPC Builder (Tools menu) in the Quartus II software. The SOPC Builder 
user interface contains the following pages: 
• System Contents page 
• System dependency page(s) 
• System Generation page 
1. System Contents Page 
This page is where system is defined. A listing of all available library components is 
included in the module pool and all of the components that have been added to a system 
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 are displayed in the module table. A single system module that includes components 
and specified interfaces is created when a system is generated with SOPC Builder. 
Additionally, automatically generated bus (interconnection) logic is contained in this 
single system module. Figure D.1 shows the System Contents page. 
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Figure D.1 The System Contents Page (from [27]) 
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 1) Module Pool 
All available library components organized according to bus type and category 
is showed in the module pool. A colored dot is used to indicate each component 
appearing next to its name. 
2) Module Table 
The module table is where components are added to the system, including 
bridges, bus interfaces, CPUs, memory interfaces, peripherals, etc. 
Additionally, the following elements are described using the module table. 
• Master and slave connectivity 
• System address map 
• System IRQ assignments 
• Arbitration priorities for shared slaves 
2. System Dependency Page(s) 
When certain components are added to a system, such as a CPU like the Nios embedded 
processor, an additional page(s) appears in SOPC Builder. These page(s) allow setting 
additional parameters or associations of the component with respect to the other 
components in the system. For example, the relationship between a CPU and the 
memory components can be specified to indicate which portion is used as the program 
memory and which portion is used as data memory. For components that use system 
dependency pages, a separate system dependency page is created for each instance of 
the component that has been added to a system. 
Additionally, if the processor components have some associated software components, 
the software components will be shown on the system dependency pages. The software 
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 components examples range from utility libraries to real-time-operating systems 
(RTOSs). Several software components are provided by Altera in development kits, 
such as the Plugs Library (a compact, full-featured TCP/IP protocol stacks) that comes 
with the Nios development kits. 
3. System Generation Page 
This page is where a system is generated. It includes options that can be set to control 
the generation process such as device family support and simulation. This page reports 
the system generation progress message(s) during system generation. Figure D.2 shows 
the System Generation page. 
 137
  
Figure D.2 The System Generation Page (from [27])
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 1) SDK 
When the SDK option is turned on, SOPC Builder creates a custom SDK for 
each CPU in a system every time the system is generated. Software files 
(drivers, libraries, and utilities) for any system components that provide software 
support in their library definition is contained in the SDK.  
Software applications can be built as part of the generation process by the 
processor components, such as the Nios embedded processor and Excalibur™ 
devices. 
The following directories are the directories that the software files are arranged 
into: 
• inc—Three things are contained in this directory: header files with the 
definitions of memory maps, register declarations for the peripherals, 
and macros that can be used to create embedded software applications. 
• lib— The library files is contained in this directory. If the component 
supports GNU tools, the libraries are compiled by SOPC Builder during 
system generation. 
• src— The source code is contained in this directory. The source code can 
be written and modified for the system using any text editor, also the 
Quartus II Text Editor can be used, which supports syntax coloring for C 
and C++ source code. 
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 2) HDL 
 
When the HDL option is turned on, SOPC Builder generates a system-level 
hardware description language (HDL) file in Verilog HDL or VHDL, depending 
on which language is specified when the system in SOPC Builder is first set up. 
 The HDL file contains (according to [25]): 
• An instance of every component in the system 
• Bus logic to interconnect the components, including the following items: 
- Address decoders 
- Data bus multiplexers 
- Arbiters for shared resources 
- Reset-generation and conditioning logic 
- Interrupt prioritization logic 
- Dynamic bus sizing (for adapting masters to slaves with wider or 
narrower data buses) 
- Passive interconnections between master and slave ports 
• A simulation testbench that: 
- Instantiates the system module 
- Drives clock and reset inputs with default behaviors 
- Instantiates and connects any simulation models for system external 
components if provided (e.g., memory models) 
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 4. Generating a System 
After a system is built and generation options are specified, the system can be generated 
by clicking the Generate button. SOPC Builder creates the following items (according 
to [25]): 
• The SDK 
• HDL files for each component in the system 
• A Block Symbol File (.bsf) for the top-level system module 
• ModelSim files 
• A Tcl script that sets up all of the files needed for Quartus II compilation 
D.2  Quartus II Development Software 
The Quartus II development tool allows designers to process multi-million gate designs 
and streamline development flows. A comprehensive environment for SOPC design is 
provided by the Quartus II development software. Because of its interfaces to industry-
standard EDA tools the software integrates into nearly any design environment. Also, 
an embedded logic analysis feature provides the ability to verify chip functionality and 
timing by observing internal and I/O signal values at system clock speeds (SignalTap). 
This feature was used extensively in the development of the Silicon Firewall. 
The Nios development kit includes the Quartus II development software, which 
contains support for the EP20K200EFC484 device that populates the Nios development 
board.  
D.3  GNUPro Toolkit Compiler and Debugger 
The GNUPro toolkit from Red Hat is an industry-standard compiler and debugger tool 
suite, which is an open-source C/C++ development tool suite optimized for the Nios 
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 embedded processor. An environment familiar to software design engineers is provided 
by the GNUPro toolkit. 
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